Part I: The Curse of Dollar Hegemony
Ever since the end of the Cold War, which actually
began winding down with President Nixon's policy of Détente, trade has overwhelmed domestic development in the global economy,
as superpower competition to win the hearts and minds of the world in the form of aid subsided. Persistent US fiscal deficits
forced the abandonment in 1971 of the Bretton Woods regime of fixed exchange rates linked to a gold-back dollar. The flawed
international finance architecture that resulted has since limited the global growth engine to operating with only the one
cylinder of international trade, leaving all other cylinders of domestic development in a state of permanent stagnation.
lessons from the 1930s Great Depression, economics thinking prevalent immediately after WWII had deemed international capital
flow undesirable and unnecessary for national development. Trade, a relatively small aspect of most national economies, was
to be mediated through fixed exchange rates pegged to a gold-backed dollar. These fixed exchange rates were to be adjusted
only gradually and periodically to reflect the relative strength of the economies participating in international trade, which
was expected to augment but not overwhelm the national economies. The impact of exchange rates was limited to the financing
of international trade. Exchange rate considerations were not expected to dictate domestic monetary and fiscal policies,
the chief function of which was to support domestic development and regarded as the inviolable province of national sovereignty.
The global economy is a comprehensive and complex system of which trade is only one sector. Yet economists
and policy-makers promoting neoliberal globalization tend to view trade as the entire global economy itself, downplaying the
importance of non-trade-related domestic development. Neoliberals promote market fundamentalism as the sole, indispensable
path for national economic growth, despite ample evidence in the past two decades that trade globalization tends to distort
balanced domestic development in ways that hurt not only the less developed, but also the developed economies. The distributional
consequences of global trade liberalization frequently work against the poor, the unemployed and the financially weak in all
economies. Reductions in tariffs reduce tax revenues for public spending that helps poor people and weaken needed protection
for endangered domestic industries. While distributional consequences of trade liberalization are complex and country-specific,
the general trend has been to exacerbate income disparity everywhere, which in turn leads to economic underperformance and
In the United States, the Mecca of free-market entrepreneurship, the statist sectors
- public finance, defense, health care, social security and public education - have kept the economy afloat in recurring,
protracted recessions, while entrepreneurial ventures such as corporate finance, insurance, high-tech manufacturing, airlines
and communication languish in extended doldrums. Unregulated markets lead naturally to monopolistic centralization and abuses
in corporate governance and finance. It is undeniable that "free" markets are inherently self-destructive of their
own freedom. Free markets depend on enlightened statist regulations to remain free and to prevent them from turning into failed
markets. Government, from monarchy to democracy, exists to protect the weak from the strong and to maintain socio-political
stability with a just socio-economic order.
The current international finance architecture is based on
the US dollar as the dominant reserve currency, which now accounts for 68 percent of global currency reserves, up from 51
percent a decade ago. Some 80 percent of all foreign exchange transactions involve dollars. In addition, all IMF loans are
denominated in dollars, as are most foreign currency loans. Yet in 2003, the US share of global exports of goods and services
was only 11% (US$1 trillion out of a world total of $9.1 trillion) and its share of global imports was 13.8% ($1.260 trillion).
Commodity price and exchange rate changes led to a 10.5% rise in world merchandise trade value in 2003 above 2002. For the
first time since 1995, dollar prices increased for both agricultural and manufactured products. World merchandise exports
per capita will amount to $1,562 in 2004, or $4.30 per day, while 30 percent of the world's population of 6.4 billion lives
on less than $1 a day, less than one-quarter of per capita export value.
Since the 1971 collapse of the
Bretton Woods regime, the dollar has been a global monetary reserve instrument that the US, and only the US, can produce by
fiat, not backed by gold. Despite recent corrections, the exchange value of the dollar is still at an 18-year trade-weighted
high, notwithstanding record US current-account and fiscal deficits and the status of the US as the world’s leading
debtor nation. The US national debt as of September 15, 2004 was $7.38 trillion, rising at the rate of $1.69 billion per day,
against a gross domestic product (GDP) of $8.73 trillion for the same period.
World trade is now a game
in which the US produces fiat dollars and the rest of the world produces goods and services that fiat dollars can buy. The
world's interlinked economies no longer trade to capture Ricardian comparative advantage; they compete in exports to capture
needed dollars to service dollar-denominated foreign debts and to accumulate dollar reserves to stabilize the value of their
currencies in world currency markets. To prevent speculative and manipulative attacks on their currencies, central banks of
all governments must acquire and hold dollar reserves in amounts that can withstand market pressure on their currencies in
circulation. The higher the market pressure to devalue a particular currency, the more dollar reserves its central bank must
hold. Only the Federal Reserve is exempt from this pressure, because the US Treasury can print dollars at will with relative
immunity. This creates a built-in support for a strong dollar that in turn forces the world's central banks to acquire and
hold more dollar reserves, making the dollar even stronger. This phenomenon is known as dollar hegemony, which is created
by a geopolitically-constructed peculiarity through which critical commodities, among the most notable being oil, are denominated
in dollars. Everyone accepts dollars because dollars can buy oil. The recycling of petro-dollars into other dollar assets
is the price the US has extracted from oil-producing countries for US tolerance for the oil-exporting cartel since 1973.
The trade value of a currency is no longer tied to the productivity of its issuing economy, but to the size of dollar reserves
held by its central bank.
By definition, dollar reserves must be invested in dollar assets, creating an
automatic capital-accounts surplus for the dollar economy. Even after a protracted period of sharp correction, US stock valuation
is still at a 25-year high and trading at a 56% premium compared with emerging market averages. Between 1996 and 2003, the
value of US equities rose around 80% compared with 60% for European and a decline of 30% for Japanese. The 1997 Asian financial
crisis cut Asia equities values by more than half, some as much as 80% in dollar terms even after drastic devaluation of local
currencies. Even though the US has been a net debtor since 1986, its net income on the international investment position
has remained positive, as the rate of return on US investments abroad continues to exceed that on foreign investments in the
US. This reflects the overall strength of the US economy, and that strength is derived from the US being the only nation
that can enjoy the benefits of sovereign credit utilization while amassing external debt, largely due to dollar hegemony.
drives the economy, not debt. Debt is the mirror reflection of credit. Even the most accurate mirror does violence to the
symmetry of its reflection. Why does a mirror turn an image right to left and not upside down as the lens of a camera does?
The scientific answer is that a mirror image transforms front to back rather than left to right as commonly assumed. Yet we
often accept this aberrant mirror distortion as uncolored truth and we unthinkingly consider the distorted reflection in the
mirror as a perfect representation.
In the language of economics, credit and debt are opposites but not
identical. In fact, credit and debt operate in reverse relations. Credit requires a positive net worth and debt does not.
One can have good credit and no debt. High debt lowers credit rating. When one understands credit, one understands the main
force behind the modern finance economy, which is driven by credit and stalled by debt. Behaviorally, debt distorts marginal
utility calculations and rearranges disposable income. Debt turns corporate shares into Giffen goods, demand for which increases
when their prices go up, and creates what Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan calls "irrational exuberance",
the economic man gone mad.
Monetary economists view government-issued money as a sovereign debt instrument
with zero maturity, historically derived from the bill of exchange in free banking. This view is valid only for specie money,
which is a debt certificate that can claim on demand a prescribed amount of gold or other specie of value. But fiat money
issued by a sovereign government is not a sovereign debt but a sovereign credit instrument. Sovereign government bonds are
sovereign debt while local government bonds are agency debt but not sovereign debt, because local governments, while they
possess limited power to tax, cannot print money, which is the exclusive authority of the Federal government or a central
government. When money buys bonds, the transaction represents sovereign credit canceling public or corporate debt. This
relationship is rather straightforward but is of fundamental importance.
Money issued by government fiat
is now exclusive legal tender in all modern national economies. The State Theory of Money (Chartalism) holds that the general
acceptance of government-issued fiat currency rests fundamentally on government's authority to tax. Government's willingness
to accept the fiat currency it issues for payment of taxes gives such issuance currency within a national economy. That currency
is sovereign credit for tax liabilities, which are dischargeable by credit instruments issued by government in the form of
fiat money. When issuing fiat money, the government owes no one anything except to make good a promise to accept its money
for tax payment. A central banking regime operates on the notion of government-issued fiat money as sovereign credit. A
central bank operates essentially as a lender of last resort to a nation's banking system, drawing on sovereign credit.
Jefferson prophesied: "If the American people allow the banks to control the issuance of their currency, first by inflation,
and then by deflation, the banks and corporations that will grow up around them will deprive people of all property until
their children will wake up homeless on the continent their fathers occupied ... The issuing power of money should be taken
from the banks and restored to Congress and the people to whom it belongs." This warning applies to other peoples in
the world as well.
Government levies taxes not to finance its operations, but to give value to its fiat
money as sovereign credit instruments. If it chooses to, government can finance its operation entirely through user fees,
as some fiscal conservatives suggest. Government needs never be indebted to the public. It creates a government debt component
to anchor the private debt market, not because it needs money. Technically, a sovereign government needs never borrow. It
can issue tax credit in the form of fiat money to meet all its liabilities. And only a sovereign government can issue fiat
money as sovereign credit.
If fiat money is not sovereign debt, then the entire conceptual structure of
finance capitalism is subject to reordering, just as physics was subject to reordering when man's worldview changed with the
realization that the earth is not stationary nor is it the center of the universe. The need for capital formation to finance
socially-useful development will be exposed as a cruel hoax, as sovereign credit can finance all socially-useful development
without problem. Private savings are not necessary to finance public socio-economic development, since private savings are
not required for the supply of sovereign credit. Thus the relationship between national private savings rate and public finance
is at best indirect. Sovereign credit can finance an economy in which unemployment is unknown, with wages constantly rising
to provide consumer buying power to prevent production overcapacity. A vibrant economy is one in which there is persistent
labor shortages that push up wages to reduce overcapacity. Private savings are needed only for private investment that has
no intrinsic social purpose or value. Savings without full employment are deflationary, as savings reduces current consumption
to provide investment to increase future supply, which is not needed in an economy with overcapacity created by lack of demand,
which in turn has been created by low wages and unemployment. Say's Law of supply creating its own demand is a very special
situation that is operative only under full employment with high wages. Say's Law ignores a critical time lag between supply
and demand that can be fatally problematic to the cash-flow needs in a fast-moving modern economy. Savings require interest
payments, the compounding of which will regressively make any financial scheme unsustainable. The religions forbade usury
for very practical reasons.
The relationship between assets and liabilities is expressed as credit and
debt, with the designation determined by the flow of obligation. A flow from asset to liability is known as credit, the reverse
is known as debt. A creditor is one who reduces his liability to increase his assets, which include the right of collection
on the liabilities of his debtors. Sovereign debt is a pretend game to make private monetary debts denominated in fiat money
The sovereign state, representing the people, owns all assets of a nation not assigned to the
private sector. This is true regardless whether the state operates on socialist or capitalist principles. Thus the state's
assets is the national wealth less that portion of private sector wealth after tax liabilities, plus all other claims on the
private sector by sovereign right. High wages are the key determinant of national wealth. Privatization generally reduces
state assets while it may increase tax revenue. As long as a sovereign state exists, its credit is limited only by the national
wealth. If sovereign credit is used to increase national wealth, then sovereign credit is limitless as long as the growth
of national wealth keeps pace with the growth of sovereign credit.
When a sovereign state issues money
as legal tender, it issues a monetary instrument backed by its sovereign rights, which includes taxation. A sovereign state
never owes domestic debts except by design voluntarily. When a sovereign state borrows in order to avoid levying or raising
taxes, it is a political expedience, not a financial necessity. When a sovereign state borrows, through the selling of sovereign
bonds denominated in its own currency, it is withdrawing previously-issued sovereign credit from the financial system. When
a sovereign state borrows foreign currency, it forfeits its sovereign credit privilege and reduces itself to an ordinary debtor
because no sovereign state can issue foreign currency.
Government bonds act as absorbers of sovereign credit
from the private sector. US Government bonds, through dollar hegemony, enjoy the highest credit rating, topping a credit
risk pyramid in international sovereign and institutional debt markets. Dollar hegemony is a geopolitical phenomenon in which
the US dollar, a fiat currency, assumes the status of primary reserve currency in the international finance architecture.
Architecture is an art the aesthetics of which is based on moral goodness, of which the current international finance architecture
is visibly deficient. Thus dollar hegemony is objectionable not only because the dollar, as a fiat currency, usurps a role
it does not deserve, but also because its effect on the world community is devoid of moral goodness, because it destroys the
ability of sovereign governments beside the US to use sovereign credit to finance the development their domestic economies,
and forces them to export to earn dollar reserves to maintain the exchange value of their own currencies.
issued by sovereign government fiat is a sovereign monopoly while debt is not. Anyone with acceptable credit rating can borrow
or lend, but only sovereign government can issue fiat money as legal tender. When sovereign government issues fiat money,
it issues certificates of its sovereign credit good for discharging tax liabilities imposed by sovereign government on its
citizens. Privately-issued money can exist only with the grace and permission of the sovereign, and is different from sovereign
government-issued money in that privately issued money is an IOU from the issuer, with the issuer owing the holder the content
of the money's backing. But sovereign government-issued fiat money is not a debt from the government because the money is
backed by a potential debt from the holder in the form of tax liabilities. Money issued by sovereign government by fiat as
legal tender is good by law for settling all debts, private and public. Anyone refusing to accept dollars in the US for payment
of debt is in violation of US law. Instruments used for settling debts are credit instruments.
up sovereign bonds with government-issued fiat money is one of the ways government releases more sovereign credit into the
economy. By logic, the money supply in an economy is not government debt because, if increasing the money supply means increasing
the national debt, then monetary easing would contract credit from the economy. But empirical evidence suggests otherwise:
monetary ease increases the supply of credit. Thus if fiat money creation by sovereign government increases credit, money
issued by sovereign government fiat is a credit instrument.
Economist Hyman Minsky rightly noted that
whenever credit is issued, money is created. The issuing of credit creates debt on the part of the counterparty; but debt
is not money, credit is. Debt is negative money, a form of financial antimatter. Physicists understand the relationship
between matter and antimatter. Einstein theorized that matter results from concentration of energy and Paul Dirac conceptualized
the by-product creation of antimatter through the creation of matter out of energy. The collision of matter and antimatter
produces annihilation that returns matter and antimatter to pure energy. The same is true with credit and debt, which are
related but opposite. They are created in separate forms out of financial energy to produce matter (credit) and antimatter
(debt). The collision of credit and debt will produce annihilation and return the resultant union to pure financial energy
un-harnessed for human benefit. The paying off of debt terminates financial interaction.
is repayable with money. Sovereign government does not become a debtor by issuing fiat money, which, in the US, takes the
form of a Federal Reserve note, not an ordinary bank note. The word "bank" does not appear on US dollars. Zero
maturity money (ZMM) in the dollar economy, which grew from $550 billion in 1971 when President Nixon took the dollar off
a gold standard, to $6.6 trillion as of June 2004, is not a federal debt. It amounts to about 65% of US GDP of $11.64 trillion,
slightly below the national debt of $7.38 trillion at the same point in time. Sovereign credit is what gives the US economy
its inherent strength.
A holder of fiat money is a holder of sovereign credit. The holder of fiat money
is not a creditor to the state, as some monetary economists mistakenly claim. Fiat money only entitles its holder a replacement
of the same money from government, nothing more. The dollar, being a Federal Reserve note, entitles the holder to exchange
the note to another identical note at a Federal Reserve Bank, and nothing else. The holder of fiat money is acting as a state
agent, with the full faith and credit of the state behind the instrument, which is good for paying taxes and is legal tender
for all debt public and private. Fiat money, like a passport, entitles the holder to the protection of the state in enforcing
sovereign credit. It is a certificate of state financial power inherent in sovereignty.
theory of money claims that government, by virtual of its power to levy taxes payable with government-designated legal tender,
does not need external financing. Accordingly, sovereign credit enables the government to finance a full-employment economy
even in a regulated market economy. The logic of Chartalism reasons that an excessively low tax rate will result in a low
demand for currency and that a chronic government fiscal surplus is economically counterproductive and unsustainable because
it drains credit from the economy continuously. The colonial administration in British Africa used land taxes to induce the
carefree natives to use its currency and engage in financial productivity.
Thus, according to Chartalist
theory, an economy can finance with sovereign credit its domestic developmental needs, to achieve full employment and maximize
balanced growth with prosperity without any need for sovereign debt or foreign loans or investment, and without the penalty
of hyperinflation. But Chartalist theory is operative only in predominantly closed domestic monetary regimes. Countries participating
in neo-liberal international free trade under the aegis of unregulated global financial and currency markets cannot operate
on Chartalist principles because of the foreign-exchange dilemma. Any government printing its own currency to finance legitimate
domestic needs beyond the size of its foreign-exchange reserves will soon find its convertible currency under attack in the
foreign-exchange markets, regardless of whether the currency is pegged at a fixed exchanged rate to another currency, or is
free-floating. Thus all non-dollar economies are forced to attract foreign capital denominated in dollars even to meet domestic
needs. But non-dollar economies must accumulate dollars reserves before they can attract foreign capital. Even with capital
control, foreign capital will only invest in the export sector where dollar revenue can be earned. But the dollars that exporting
economies accumulate from trade surpluses can only be invested in dollar assets, depriving the non-dollar economies of needed
capital in domestic sectors. The only protection from such attacks on domestic currency is to suspend full convertibility,
which then will keep foreign investment away. Thus dollar hegemony, the subjugation of all other fiat currencies to the
dollar as the key reserve currency, starves non-dollar economies of needed capital by depriving their governments of the power
to issue sovereign credit for domestic development.
Under principles of Chartalism, foreign capital serves
no useful domestic purpose outside of an imperialistic agenda. Dollar hegemony essentially taxes away the ability of the trading
partners of the US to finance their own domestic development in their own currencies, and forces them to seek foreign loans
and investment denominated in dollars, which the US, and only the US, can print at will with relative immunity.
Mundell-Fleming thesis, for which Robert Mundell won the 1999 Nobel Prize, states that in international finance, a government
has the choice among (1) stable exchange rates, (2) international capital mobility and (3) domestic policy autonomy (full
employment, interest rate policies, counter-cyclical fiscal spending, etc). With unregulated global financial markets, a government
can have only two of the three options.
Through dollar hegemony, the United States is the only country
that can defy the Mundell-Fleming thesis. For more than a decade since the end of the Cold War, the US has kept the fiat
dollar significantly above its real economic value, attracted capital account surpluses and exercised unilateral policy autonomy
within a globalized financial system dictated by dollar hegemony. The reasons for this are complex but the single most important
reason is that all major commodities, most notably oil, are denominated in dollars, mostly as an extension of superpower geopolitics.
This fact is the anchor for dollar hegemony which makes possible US finance hegemony, which makes possible US exceptionism
Foreign investors held $1.61 trillion, or 24.3 percent, of the $6.63 trillion of outstanding
corporate bonds at the end of the first quarter of 2004, up from 22.1 percent in the first quarter of 2003, 13.5 percent on
average throughout the 1990s and 11.9 percent in the 1980s. US life insurance companies held a slim lead as the largest owners
of corporate debt, with $1.62 trillion, or 24.4 percent of the market, but that lead is expected to be overtaken soon by foreigners.
The rising US trade deficits will continue to increase foreign ownership of all types of US securities. The dollar-denominated
trade surplus for foreign economies is invested in US government and agency securities and corporate stocks and bonds. The
jump in the US trade deficit to a record high of $55.8 billion for June 2004 has once again refocused the spotlight on the
rising external indebtedness of the US economy. Despite the recent fall of some 20 percent in the exchange value of the dollar
against other major currencies, the US trade gap increased to $55.8 billion in June 2004 from $42.7 billion in December 2003.
The current account deficit trend, which measures the rate at which the US is going into external debt, continues to rise.
The payments gap was $542 billion for 2003, easily eclipsing the previous high of $481 billion recorded in 2002. At current
rate, the trade gap for 2004 will exceed $600 billion, an unsettling level of 5.2% of GDP.
The 9.7% annual
decline in the real value of the U.S. dollar since the first quarter of 2002 has little effect in reducing the trade deficit.
The dollar fell much more against the Euro (38% in nominal terms) than other currencies. The U.S. deficit with Western Europe
rose 16.9% in the first half of 2004. Asian nations engaged in heavy intervention in foreign exchange markets in order to
prevent the dollar from falling against their currencies. China and Hong Kong peg their currencies to the dollar at a fixed
Federal Reserve Board chairman Alan Greenspan has expressed the view that the weaker dollar should
eventually help narrow the trade deficit, with a warning that “creeping protectionism” could endanger
the flexibility of the global financial system. Greenspan feels that global financial markets will be able to finance the
US payments gap with a daily capital inflow of between $1.5 - 2 billion, provided trade and finance restrictions are not imposed
by government measures. The national debt is rising at the rate of $1.69 billion per day. Net capital inflow requirement
adds up to $730 billion annually. If and when this inflow of funds should reverse for any number of reasons, a major financial
crisis could erupt. Flow of Funds data released by the Federal Reserve shows that US financial markets are becoming ever more
dependent on inflows of foreign capital. This foreign capital has essentially been created by recycling US external debt,
not savings. Foreign governments provided 86% of total capital inflows in the first quarter of 2004, 94% of which from Asia.
Greenspan has also denied the existence of a housing bubble, by noting that the US housing market is disaggregated.
Yet the residential mortgage market is non-placed related. Fanny Mae, created by Congress during the New Deal decades ago
to make home mortgages available to middle and low income buyers, and current under inquiry on violation of generally accepted
accounting principles from supervisory authorities, markets its mortgage-backed securities worldwide and engages in large
scale interest rate derivative trading. The stratospheric rise in home prices in recent years has been largely financed by
low-cost, high debt-to-equity ratio mortgages sourced from foreign creditors.
During the fourth quarter
of 2003, foreign creditors loaned US borrowers an unprecedented $848 billion annualized, an amount equal to one-third of all
credit market lending. For 2003 as a whole, foreign investors accounted for 22.6 percent of net new lending in US markets
and raised their share of outstanding credit market debt by a percentage point to 10.9 percent. Between 2000 and 2003, the
volume of credit market instruments (US government securities, agency debt, corporate bonds and commercial papers) owned by
foreign investors expanded by more than half. Mainly as a result of purchases of corporate and Treasury debt, foreign acquisitions
of US credit market instruments soared to a record $611.2 billion in 2003, more than acquisitions in the previous two years
combined. Between October and December of 2003, foreign investors bought 89 percent of net new securities issued by the US
Treasury and 40 percent of bonds issued by US corporations. In a bid to stabilize their own currencies against a falling dollar,
Asian central banks have been purchasing dollars to keep their currencies from rising, with which they then use to buy US
sovereign and private debt. Largely as a result of this process, central banks and other foreign public agencies accounted
for two thirds of the acquisitions of US Treasury securities during the fourth quarter of 2003. The trend is expected to
increase for 2004.
The rising US external debt, fuelled by a $600 billion trade deficit coupled with record
federal budget deficit of more than $500 billion, has prompted concerns that, at some point, foreign investors are going to
lose confidence and begin withdrawing funds or at least slowing the inflow. There is also the nagging risk that ever-growing
current account deficits would lead to US protectionist measures and an overdue questioning of the role of the dollar as a
primary reserve currency. World economic growth as a whole continues to depend critically on expansion of the US economy,
but this expansion is dependent on and continues to generate ever-increasing levels of domestic and external debt. The US
economy is vacuuming up the world's surplus capital to finance its rising debt, depraving other economies of needed capital
for domestic development, while dollar hegemony prevent non-dollar economies from utilizing sovereign credit. China's strong
manufacturing sector attracted foreign direct investment (FDI) worth $53.5 billion in 2003, compared with US$52.7 billion
in 2002. The US, traditionally the largest recipient of FDI, saw such investment plunge by 53% in 2003 to reach $30 billion
- the lowest in 12 years. But while FDI in the US supports the dollar economy, almost all of China’s fast rising
FDI is concentrated in the export sector, which operates to support the dollar economy, not China’s domestic development
or the yuan economy.
Interest rates, at least short term rate controlled by the Fed Funds rate (FFR)
target, are not predictable by merely observing market trends since the FFR is determined not by market fundamentals but by
Federal Reserve ideology of sound money as dictated by the Fed's institutional role of fighting inflation, modified by its
judgment on the need for counter-cyclical monetary stimulation. The only way to predict FFR level is to get into the mind
of Greenspan, or whoever happens to be Chairman of the Fed.
But low interest rates does not stop foreigners
from investing in the US, it only pushes foreigners from low-yield US Treasuries into higher-yield corporate bond markets.
If foreigners should stop funding US debts, the Fed can make up the slack by printing more dollars, as Fed Vice Chairman Ben
S. Bernanke has publicly suggested, killing the two birds of high oil price and massive debts with one inflationary stone.
But the dollars that foreigners have accumulated from trade surpluses from the US cannot be converted back into their own
currencies without causing their own currencies to appreciate against the dollar, thus reducing foreign exporters trade surplus
in dollars. This is part of the circular trap of dollar hegemony. Also, foreign exporters selling the dollars they have accumulated
from trade will only cause the dollar to fall further, causing these foreigners to lose more than they gain as their remaining
dollar holdings will lose foreign exchange value against their own currencies.
Thus if China which as of
September 2004 holds over $485 billion in foreign reserves sells $10 billion for yuan, or euro, or yen to try prevent loss
from a falling dollar, the remaining $475 billion will be worth less than the gain (or stop-loss) from the $10 billion sale,
which adds downward pressure on the dollar. Thus foreign-owned dollars are trapped with nowhere to go except to stay in the
dollar economy. It does not mean however, that these dollars will all return to the US geographically; some will remain as
euro-dollars (which has nothing to do with euros, but is a term meaning offshore dollars). The expansion of euro-dollars,
mostly in Asia, will mean that the dollar economy is swallowing up Asia, turning it into a financial colony of the dollar
which the US can print at will with relative immunity.
Dollar hegemony may be good for the dollar economy,
but it is not necessarily good even for the US economy. Those who still have jobs or income in the US that earn more than
their counterparts outside of the US will fall victim to outsourcing brought about by corporate arbitrage on cross-border
wage disparity. Worker pension funds, in search of highest return on investment from transnational corporations that maximize
their profit from cross-border wage arbitrage, are unwittingly depriving the future pensioners of their high-wage jobs, pushing
them into early involuntary retirement with reduced annuity. Unemployment in the US will continue to rise to support transnational
corporate profit maximization from outsourcing. First textile, than manufacturing, then high-tech and next will be financial
services, beyond back office outsourcing, but hungry 25-year-old investment bankers and traders overseas who will settle happily
for $1 million a year instead of the $3 million demanded by bankers and traders in New York. Cross-border wage disparity
will not moderate until cross-border purchasing power parity (PPP) gap moderates, and PPP gap is mostly a dysfunctionality
of the exchange rate regime under dollar hegemony.
US interest rates will stay below market for the foreseeable
future, until dollar hegemony ends. Whether dollar hegemony ends depends on whether China has enough foresight to kick start
a new international finance architecture. So far, there is no sign that China has the wits to do much, except complacently
counting the dollars China accumulates while not realizing the more dollars China holds, the more the Chinese economy loses
by exporting real wealth from the yuan economy to the dollar economy, as Japan has done since the end of the Cold War. Hopefully
the new generation of Chinese leaders will be better advised about the curse of dollar hegemony. On the other side, the US
is getting to be like Saudi Arabia, which has been ruined by its oil riches denominated in dollars, saddling the country with
a whole generation of citizens with no marketable skills at competitive wages. The only difference is that while Saudi Arabia
pumps oil, the US prints dollars.
Dollar hegemony is reducing the US to a country whose workers are overpaid
across the board by international standards. While Greenspan justifies US high wages by citing continuous rise in productivity,
such rise is achieved essentially by foreign workers doing most of the producing. Ultimately, productivity cannot be increased
by not working. The only jobs that will not be outsourced will be those that are location-tied, such as cooking and serving
meals, caring for the sick, the young and the aged, vacuuming carpets, cleaning toilets and picking fruits. Such jobs do
not pay a living wage in the US turbo economy, and to fill them the US imports illegal immigrants. Greenspan's warning about
creeping US trade protectionism amounts to a trade-off between losing high-pay jobs and defaulting on low-interest foreign
Foreigners are buying US corporate debt, not equities. To fund its twin deficits, the US economy
continues to rely on sustained foreign funding. Foreigners purchased net public debt of $61.33 billion and $21.3 billion of
corporate bonds in February 2004, but practically no equities, only $100 million. Even then, private investor purchases of
public debt fell by half to $10 billion, the rest bought by foreign central banks which are constrained by policy on high-risk
investment. The lack of interest in equity suggests that foreigners have little faith in the continuing growth of the US
economy and are aware that the US bankruptcy regime grants preference to debt before equity.
inflows into the US of $83.4 billion in February 2004, although slightly lower than $92.3 billion in January, were almost
double the $45 billion a month required to fund the US current account deficit. This validates Greenspan's assertion that
the US has no trouble funding its external deficit. US workers, however, will have trouble holding on to their high-paying
Part II: China and a New International Finance Architecture
hegemony is a geopolitical phenomenon in which the US dollar, a fiat currency, assumes the status of primary reserve currency
in the international finance architecture. While frequently rationalized as necessary for facilitating world trade, dollar
hegemony is not benign. It inevitably contributes to increasing trade friction in the global trading system, by pushing exchange
rates manipulation as the main tool of competition in export trade.
China's trading relationship with the
US impacts the entire global economy materially. Much has been made about China's pegging its currency to the dollar even
though the yuan is not freely convertible. Calls for upward revaluation of the Chinese yuan are heard frequently. There
may be a case for arguing for higher prices for Chinese exports, if the increase is passed directly onto wages to increase
domestic demand. But the logic of revaluing the yuan, or any currency, as a means of balancing trade is flawed. Exchange
rate moves affect the price of both import and export, but their impact on trade balance may only result in changes in the
volume of trade rather the monetary value of trade. With a stronger yuan, less Chinese goods and services may be exported
to the US, but at a higher price; and more US goods and services may be exported to China at a lower price, but the trade
imbalance in monetary value may remain the same after initial adjustments. Historical data suggest that US firm will take
advantage of the exchange rate move to raise prices of US exports. The result may merely be higher inflation rate for the
US and eventually for the global economy.
China's excessive dependence on foreign trade has significantly
distorted its economic growth, as indicated by the high percentage of foreign trade to its gross domestic product (GDP), estimated
to reach near 90% in 2004. China's high-growth coastal east and south depend heavily on foreign trade. The average rate
of foreign trade dependence of the 12 provinces and municipalities in coastal east and south China was 74.5% in 2000 while
the rate in the 19 provinces and autonomous regions in the interior central and western regions was only 10%. In 2003, Shenzhen
and Shanghai scored 356.3% and 148.7% respectively. Much of this trade takes the form of low-wage assembly for re-export,
and although the trend is changing toward vertically integrated manufacturing, the re-export aspect remains dominant. Some
54% of China's total exports were being traded by foreign investors.
China does not have a diversified
trade market. Trade between China and its three biggest trade partners - the US, Japan and the European Union - accounts for
about one half of its total. The economic performances of these major trade partners not only critically affect their trade
with China, but also affect Chinese trade with the rest of the world in which China incurs a persistent, small but rising
deficit. Trade between China and the US constituted 5.4% of China's GDP in 1997. The ratio climbed to 13% of the $1.4 trillion
GDP in 2003 when trade volume was $181 billion with a US deficit of $124 billion. Since China incurred an overall trade deficit
of $500 million in 2003, the entire US trade deficit with China was transferred to other economies outside China, mostly in
developing economies. Yet the abnormally high reliance on trade with the US, with an ever-widening trade gap, is a structural
cause for rising Sino-US trade conflicts. The US trade deficit with China is now the largest in the world. China alone was
responsible for 53% of the increase in US non-oil trade deficit through June 2004. US imports from China are now five times
the value of US exports to China, making this the most imbalanced trading relationship for the US, albeit US trade policy
limiting dual technology export to China also contributed to this imbalance. The relatively low growth rate of the matured
economies, such as the US, EU and Japan, cannot sustain the high growth rate of Chinese export trade. Also, all three of
these countries are actively engaged in using low-wage manufacturing in China for world-wide re-export, distorting Chinese
Trade reliance ratio is determined by many factors, including GDP calculation, exchange rate
distortions, methods of trade and trade competence of a nation. Nevertheless, one fact stands out: China's dollar-denominated
trade surplus benefits the dollars economy and not the yuan economy. It contributes significantly to China's capital shortage
for domestic development, siphoning needed capital to its foreign reserves.
China's import for 2004 is
expected to exceed $500 billion and total trade could exceed $1 trillion, with total sales of consumer goods and capital goods
reaching $1.83 trillion, which appears impressive until when it translates to only $1,306 per person. Because of high trade
reliance ratio, some $330 billion of goods will fail to show up in 2004 Chinese GDP, which is expected to rise around 8% from
2003 to $1.5 trillion. The economy grew 9.6% in second quarter, slowing from 9.8% in the first quarter after the government
imposed lending curbs to cool an overinvestment boom that caused power shortages, infrastructure bottlenecks and escalating
inflation. The government targeted growth at 7% earlier for 2004. China will continue to import advanced technology equipment,
high-tech products, basic raw materials and consumer goods, but it has a long way to go before reaching the full potential
of a developed Chinese domestic market.
Chinese trade reached a record high of $851 billion in 2003 with
a GDP of $1.4 billion; exports rose 34.6% to $438 billion against a rise in imports of 39.9% to $413 billion. In the first
eight months of 2004, China recorded a trade deficit of $950 million; exports rose 35.8% to $361 billion while imports increased
40.8% to $362 billion. The continuing increase in China's foreign exchange reserves in the face of a trade deficit means
that China's domestic sector is subsidizing its export sector to the tune of its trade deficit plus its foreign exchange reserves
growth. Wealth has left the yuan economy into the dollar economy.
The distributional consequences of
trade on energy consumption are significant. For the US, energy consumption per dollar of GDP dropped from 17,440 Btu in
1973, year of the OPEC oil embargo, to 9,460 Btu in 2003. The drop was achieved partly by importing energy-intensive products.
Unlike other developing countries such as India, South Korea and Brazil, the amount of energy consumed per dollar of GDP has
decreased dramatically in China over the past two decades. Still, China consumed 35,000 Btu per dollar of GDP in 1999. With
average annual GDP growth rates around 7-8% over the last decade and energy consumption growth rates somewhat lower, China
has been reducing its energy intensity. This is in large part a result of government efforts to conserve energy, and the
updating of industrial plant equipment. China's Energy Conservation Law entered into force on January 1, 1998. The government
has promoted a shift towards less energy-intensive services and higher value-added products, as well as encouraged the import
of energy-intensive products. While China ranks second in the world behind the United States in total energy consumption and
carbon emissions, its per capita energy consumption and carbon emissions are much lower than the world average. In 2001, the
US had a per capita energy consumption of 341.8 million Btu, greater than 5.2 times the world's per capita energy consumption
and slightly over 11 times China's. Per capita carbon emissions are similar to energy consumption patterns, with the United
States emitting 5.5 metric tons of carbon per person, the world on average 1.1 metric tons, and China 0.6 metric tons of carbon.
China's oil imports for the first eight months of 2004 were up 39% cent at 79.9 million tons. China is
reported to be planning to invest $12 billion in the Russian energy industry, with an interest in buying parts of Yukos, the
embattled Russian oil giant. China takes about 7% of its oil from Yukos, already suffered a cut to its supplies because the
Russian company cannot pay transport costs in September. China is reported to be forced to prepay transportation costs to
Yukos to avoid supply interruption. Much of this energy is needed only by the export sector.
to activate its domestic market to balance its overblown foreign trade. The Chinese economy can benefit enormously by the
aggressive deployment of sovereign credit for domestic development and growth, particularly in the slow-growth western and
central regions. Sovereign credit can be used to stimulate domestic demand by raising wage levels, improve farm income, promote
state-owned-enterprise restructuring and bank reform, build needed infrastructure, promote education and health care, re-order
the pension system, restore the environment and promote a cultural renaissance. While exchange control continues, China can
free its economy from the dictate of dollar hegemony, adopt a strategy of balanced development financed by sovereign credit
and wean itself from excess dependence on export for dollars. Sovereign credit can finance full employment with rising wages
in the Chinese economy of 1.4 billion people and project it towards the largest economy in the world within a very short time,
possibly in less than five years. The expansion of its domestic economy will enable China to import more, thus also allowing
it to export more without excessive and persistent trade gaps. Much needs to be done, and can be done to develop the full
potential of China's economy, but exporting for dollars is not the way to do it.
China is in the position
to kick start a new international finance architecture that will serve international trade better. China has the option of
making the yuan an alternative reserve currency in world trade by simply denominating all Chinese export in yuan. This sovereign
action can be taken unilaterally at any time of China's choosing. All the Chinese State Council has to do is to announce
that as of a certain date all Chinese exports must be paid for in yuan, making it illegal for Chinese exporters to accept
payment in any other currencies. This will set off a frantic scramble by importers of Chinese goods around the world to buy
yuan at the State Administration for Foreign Exchange (SAFE), making the yuan a preferred currency with ready market demand.
Companies with yuan revenue no longer need to exchange yuan into dollars, as the yuan, backed by the value of Chinese exports,
becomes universally accepted in trade. Members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which import sizable
amount of Chinese goods, would accept yuan for payment for their oil, so will Russia. This can be done without de-pegging
the yuan from the dollar and SAFE can retain it position as the exclusive window for trading yuans for other currencies without
any need for new currency control regulations. The proper exchange rate of the yuan can then be set by China not based on
export to the US, but on Chinese conditions.
If Chinese exports are paid in yuan, China will have no need
to hold foreign reserves, which currently stand at more than $480 billion. And if the Hong Kong dollar is pegged to the yuan
instead of the dollar, Hong Kong's $120 billion foreign-exchange reserves can also be freed for domestic restructuring and
development. Chinese trade surplus would stay in the yuan economy. China is on the way to becoming a world economic giant
but it has yet to assert its rightful financial power because of dollar hegemony.
There is no stopping
China from being a powerhouse in manufacturing. Many Asian economies are trapped in protracted financial crisis from excessive
foreign-currency debts and falling real export revenue resulting from predatory currency devaluation. The International Monetary
Fund (IMF), orchestrated by the US, has come to the "rescue" of these distressed economies with a new agenda beyond
the usual IMF conditionalities of austerity to protect Group of Seven (G7) creditors. This new agenda aims to open Asian markets
for US transnational corporations to acquire distressed Asian companies so that the foreign-acquired Asian subsidiaries can
produce and market goods and services inside Asian national borders as domestic enterprises, thus skirting potential protectionist
measures. The United States, through the IMF, aims to break down the traditionally closed financial systems all over Asia.
This system mobilizes high national savings to finance industrial policies to serve giant national industrial conglomerates
with massive investment in targeted export sectors. The IMF, controlled by the US, aims at dismantling these traditional Asian
financial systems and forcing Asians to replace them with a structurally alien global system, characterized by open markets
for products and services and crucially, for financial products and services. The focus is of course on China, for as US policymakers
know: as China goes, so goes the rest of Asia.
Trade flows under neoliberal globalization in the context
of dollar hegemony have put Asian countries in a position of unsustainable dependency on foreign, dollar-denominated loans
and capital to finance export sectors that are at the mercy of saturated foreign markets while neglecting domestic development
to foster productive forces and to support budding domestic consumer markets. In Asia, outside the small elite circle of well-heeled
compradores, most people cannot afford the products they produce in abundance for export, nor can they afford high-cost imports.
An average worker in Asia would have to work days making hundreds of pairs of shoes at low wages to earn enough to buy one
McDonald's hamburger meal for his family while Asian compradores entertain their foreign backers in luxurious five-star hotels
with prime steaks imported from Omaha. Markets outside of Asia cannot grow fast enough to satisfy the developmental needs
of the populous Asian economies. Thus intra-region trade to promote domestic development within Asia needs to be the main
focus of growth if Asia is ever to rise above the level of semi-colonial subsistence that will inevitably translate into political
The Chinese economy will move quickly up the trade-value chain, in advanced electronics,
telecommunications, and aerospace, which are inherently "dual use" technologies with military implications. Strategic
phobia will push the US to exert all its influence to keep the global market for "dual use" technologies closed
to China. Thus "free trade" for the US is not the same as freedom to trade. Increasingly, the world's nations will
all procure their military needs from the same global technology market. Depriving any nation access to dual-use technology
will not enhance national security as the deprived nation can easily shift to asymmetrical warfare which is more destabilizing
than conventional armament.
Still, China will inevitably be a major global player in the knowledge industries
because of its abundant supply of raw human potential. Even in the US, a high percentage of its scientists are of Chinese
ethnicity. With an updated educational system, China will be a top producer of brain power within another decade. World leaders
in high-tech, such as Intel and Microsoft, are actively pursuing cross-border R&D wage-arbitrage in Asia, primarily in
China and India. As China moves up the technology ladder, coupled with rising consumer demand in tandem with a growth economy,
global trade flow will be affected, modifying the "race to the bottom" predatory competitive game of two decades
of globalization among Asian exporters to acquire dollars to invest in the dollar economy, toward trade to earn their own
currencies for investment in domestic development.
Asian economies will find in China a preferred alternative
trading partner, possibly with more symbiotic trading terms, providing more room to structure trade to enhance domestic development
along the path of converging regional interest and solidarity. The rise in living standards in all of Asia will change the
path of history, restoring Asia as a center of advanced civilization, putting an end to two centuries of Western economic
and cultural imperialism and dominance.
The foreign-trade strategies of all trading nations in recent
decades of neoliberal globalization have contributed to the destabilizing of the global trading system. It is not possible
or rational for all countries to export themselves out of domestic recessions or poverty. The contradictions between national
strategic industrial policies and neoliberal open-market systems will generate friction between the US and all its trading
partners, as well as among regional trade blocs and inter-region competitors. The US engages in global trade to enhance its
superpower status, not to undermine it. Thus the US does not seek equal partners as a matter of course. With economic sanctions
as a tool of foreign policy, the US has been preventing, or trying to prevent, an increasing number of US transnational companies,
and foreign companies trading with the US, from doing business in an increasing number of countries deemed rogue by Washington.
Trade flows not where it is needed most, but to where it best serves the US national security interest.
globalization has promoted the illusion that trade is a win-win transaction for all, based on the Ricardian model of comparative
advantage. Yet economists recognize that without global full employment, comparative advantage is merely Say's Law internationalized.
Say's Law states that supply creates its own demand, but only under full employment, a pre-condition supply-siders conveniently
ignore. After two decades, this illusion has been shattered by concrete data: poverty has increased worldwide and global wages,
already low to begin with, have declined since the Asian financial crisis of 1997, and by 45 percent in some countries, such
Yet export to the US under dollar hegemony is merely an arrangement in which the exporting
nations, in order to earn dollars to buy needed commodities denominated in dollars and to service dollar loans, are forced
to finance the consumption of US consumers by the need to invest their trade surplus dollars in dollar assets as foreign-exchange
reserves, giving the US a rising capital account surplus to finance its rising current account deficit.
the trade surpluses are achieved not by an advantage in the terms of trade, but by sheer self-denial of basic domestic needs
and critical imports necessary for domestic development. Not only are the exporting nations debasing the value of their labor,
degrading their environment and depleting their natural resources for the privilege of running on the poverty treadmill, they
are enriching the dollar economy and strengthening dollar hegemony in the process, and causing harm also to the US economy.
Thus the exporting nations allow themselves to be robbed of needed capital for critical domestic development in such vital
areas as education, health and other social infrastructure, by assuming heavy foreign debt to finance export, while they beg
for even more foreign investment in the export sector by offering still more exorbitant returns and tax exemptions, putting
increased social burden on the domestic economy. Yet many small economies around the world have no option but to continue
to serve dollar hegemony like a drug addiction.
Japan provides the perfect proof that even a dynamic,
successful export machine does not by itself produce a healthy economy. Japan is aware that it needs to restructure its domestic
economy, away from its export fixation and upgrade the living standard of its overworked population and to reorder its domestic
consumption patterns. But Japan is trapped into helplessness by dollar hegemony.
Japan sees its sovereign
credit rating lowered by international rating agencies while it remains the world's biggest creditor nation. Moody's Investor
Service downgraded Japanese government bonds by two notches recently to A2, or one grade below Botswana's, not to mention
Chile and Hungary. Japan has the world's largest foreign-exchange reserves: $819 billion in July 2004; the world's biggest
domestic savings: $11.4 trillion (US gross domestic product was $11 trillion in 2003); and $1 trillion in overseas investment.
And 95% of its sovereign debt is held by Japanese nationals, which rules out risk of default similar to Argentina. Japan
has given Botswana, where half of the population is infected with the AIDS virus, $12 million in grants and $102 million in
Why does the New York-based rating agency prefer Botswana to Japan? The Botswanan government budget
is controlled by foreign diamond-mining interests to protect their investment in the mines. Botswana does not run any budget
deficit to develop its domestic economy or to help its poverty-stricken people. Thus Botswana is considered a good credit
risk for foreign loans and investment. Japan, on the other hand, is forced to suffer the high interest cost of a low credit
rating because its responsive government attempts to solve, through deficit financing, the nation's economic woes that have
resulted from excessive focus on export. Dollar hegemony denies a good credit rating even to the world's largest holder of
The Asia-Pacific trading system has been structured to serve markets outside of Asia
by providing low wage manufacturing. This enables the US to consume more without inflation and without raising domestic wages.
All the trade surpluses accumulated by the Asian economies have ended up financing the US debt bubble, which is not even good
for the US economy in the long run. Low-price imports allow the US to keep domestic wages low without dampening consumer power
and contribute to a rising disparity of both income and wealth within the US where purchasing power comes increasingly from
debt supported by capital gain rather than rising wages. The result is that when the equity bubble of inflated price-earning
ratio finally bursts, wages are too low to keep the economy from crashing from a collapse of the wealth effect.
thoroughly impoverishing the Asian economies by making possible financial manipulation of crisis proportions, dollar hegemony
now works to penetrate the remaining Asian markets that have stayed relatively closed: notably Japan, China and South Korea.
Control of access to its markets has been Asia's principal instrument for its sub-optimized trade advantage and distorted
industrial development. This strategy had been practiced successfully first by Japan and copied in various degree of success
by the Asian Tigers. Protectionism will survive in Asian economies long after formal accession by these economies to the World
Trade Organization (WTO).
Once free from dollar hegemony, China can finance its domestic development without
foreign loans and capital. The Chinese economy then will no longer be distorted by excessive reliance on export merely to
earn dollars that by definition must be invested in dollar assets, not yuan assets. The aim of development is to raise wage
levels, not to push wages down to achieve predatory export competitiveness. Yet export under dollar hegemony requires keeping
wages low, a prerequisite that condemns an economy to perpetual underdevelopment. Terms such as "openness" need
to be reconsidered away from the distorted meanings assigned to them by neoliberal cultural hegemony. The contradiction between
globalizing and territorially-based national social and political forces is framed in the context of past, present and future
Globalization is not a new trend. It is the natural policy for all empire building. Globalization
under modern capitalism began with the British Empire, marked by the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, five years after the
Opium War with China, and two years before the Revolutions of 1848. Great Britain embarked on a systemic promotion of free
trade and chose to depend on imported food, which gave a survivalist justification to economic empire. France adopted free
trade in 1860 and within 10 years was faced with the Paris Commune, which was suppressed ruthlessly by the French bourgeoisie,
who put to death 20,000 workers and peasants, including children. Despite a backlash movement toward protective tariffs in
Britain, Holland and Belgium, the global economy of the 19th century was characterized by high mobility of goods across political
borders. As Europe adopted political nationalism, international economic liberalism developed in parallel, until 1914. World
War I, the 1929 Depression and World War II caused a temporary halt of free trade. The US "Open Door" policy for
pre-revolutionary China, proclaimed by John Hay in 1899, was part of a globalization scheme to preserve US commercial interests
by preventing the partition of China by European powers and Japan, after the US became a Far Eastern power through the acquisition
of the Philippines. The Open Door policy was rooted in the most-favored-nation clause in the unequal treaties imposed on
China by Western imperialist powers.
Like the United States now, Britain was a predominantly importing
economy by the close of the 18th century. Despite the Industrial Revolution's expanded export of manufacturing goods, import
of raw material, food and consumer amenities grew faster in value than export of manufacturing goods and coal. The key factor
that sustained this trade imbalance was the predominance of the British pound, as it is today with the US dollar and its impact
on the trade finance. British hegemony of sea transportation and financial services (cross-currency trade finance and insurance)
earned Britain vast amounts of foreign currencies that could be sold in the London money markets to importers of Argentine
meat and Canadian bacon. International credit and capital markets were centered in London. The export of financial services
and capital produced factor income that served as hidden surplus to cushion the trade deficit. To enhance financial hegemony,
the British maintain separate dependent currencies in all parts of the empire under pound-sterling hegemony. This financial
hegemony is now centered on New York with the dollar as the base currency. When the Asian tigers export to the United States,
all they get in return are US Treasury bills and corporate bonds, not direct investment in Asia. Asian labor in fact is working
at low wages mainly to finance the expansion of the dollar economy.
Market fundamentalism, a modern euphemism
of capitalism, is thus made necessary by the finance architecture imposed on the world by the hegemonic finance power, first
19th-century Great Britain, now the United States. When the developing economies call for a new international finance architecture,
this is what they are really driving at. Foreign-exchange markets ensure that the endless demand for dollar capital by the
poor exporting nations will never be met. British economist John A Hobson identified the surplus of capital in the core economies
and the need for its export to the impoverished parts of the world as the material basis of imperialism. For neo-imperialism
of the 21st century, this remains fundamentally true.
Then as now, the international economy rested on
an international money system. Britain adopted the gold standard in 1816, with Europe and the US following in the 1870s. Until
1914, the exchange rates of most currencies were highly stable, except in victimized, semi-colonial economies such as Turkey
and China. The gold standard, while greatly facilitating free trade, was hard on economies that produced no gold, and the
gold-based monetary regime was generally deflationary (until the discovery of new gold deposits in South Africa, California
and Alaska), which favored capital. William Jenning Bryan spoke for the world in 1896 when he declared that mankind should
not be "crucified upon this cross of gold". But the 50-year lead time of the British gold standard firmly established
London as the world's financial center. The world's capital was drawn to London to be redistributed to investments of the
highest return around the world. Borrowers around the world were reduced to playing a game of "race to the bottom"
to compete for capital.
The bulk of economic theories within the context of capitalism were invented to
rationalize this global system as natural truth. The fundamental shift from the labor value theory to the marginal utility
theory was a circular self-validation of the artificial characteristics of an artificial construct based on the sanctity of
capital, despite Karl Marx's dissection that capital cannot exist without labor - until assets are put to use to increase
labor productivity, it remains idle assets.
Mergers and acquisitions became rampant. Small business capitalism
disappeared between 1880 and 1890. Workers and small businesses found that they were not competing against their neighbors,
but those on other sides of the world, operating from structurally different socioeconomic systems. The corporation, first
used to facilitate the private ownership of railroads, became the organization of choice for large industries and commerce,
issuing stocks and bonds to finance its undertakings that fell beyond the normal financial resources of individual entrepreneurs.
This process increased the power of banks and financial institutions and brought forth finance capitalism.
Cartels and trusts emerged, using vertical and horizontal integration to eliminate competition and manipulate markets and
prices for entire sectors of the economy. Middle-class membership was mainly concentrated in salaried workers of corporations,
while working class members were hourly wage earners in factories. The 1848 Revolutions were the first proletariat revolutions
in modern time. The creation of an integrated world market, the financing and development of economies outside of Europe and
the rising standards of living for Europeans were triumphs of the 19th-century system of unregulated capitalism. In the 20th
century, the process continued, with the center shifting to the US after two world wars.
in his National System of Political Economy (1841), asserted that political economy as espoused in England at that time, far
from being a valid science universally, was merely British national opinion, suited only to English historical conditions.
List's institutional school of economics asserted that the doctrine of free trade was devised to keep England rich and powerful
at the expense of its trading partners and that it had to be fought with protective tariffs and other devices of economic
nationalism by the weaker countries. List's economic nationalism influenced Asian leaders, including Sun Yatsen of China,
who proposed industrial policies financed with sovereign credit. List was also the influence behind the Meiji Reform Movement
of 1868 in Japan. Alexander Hamilton, by proposing the US Treasury using tax revenue to assume and pay off all public debts
incurred by the Confederation in his 1791 Report on Public Debt, through the establishment of a national bank, provided the
new nation with sovereign credit in the form of paper money for development.
The current breakdown of neoliberal
globalized market fundamentalism offers Asia a timely opportunity to forge a fairer deal in its economic relation with the
rest of the world. The United States, as a bicoastal nation, must begin to treat Asian-Pacific nations as equal members of
an Asian-Pacific commonwealth in a new world economic order that renders economic nationalism unnecessary.
as potentially the largest economy in the Asia-Pacific region, has a key role to play in shaping this new world economic order.
To do that, China must look beyond its current myopic effort to join a collapsing global export market economy and provide
a model of national development in which foreign trade is reassigned to its proper place in the economy from its current all-consuming
priority. The first step in that direction is for China to free itself from dollar hegemony and embark on a domestic development
program with sovereign credit.
Here I'll put a brief summary or overview of this article.