CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE BRAIN:
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY


by

Ralph D. Ellis, Ph.D.
Clark Atlanta University
ralphellis@mindspring.com

Natika Newton, Ph.D.
New York Institute of Technology
nnewton@suffolk.lib.ny.us


Index: A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z

G

Gainotti, Guido, Carlo Caltagirone, and P. Zoccolotti. 1993. "Left/right and cortical/subcortical dichotomies in the neurophychological study of human emotions". Cognition and Emotion 7: 71-93.
EEG patterns and CT scans correlated with feelings of elation and depression.

Garfield, C.A. 1984. Sporting Body, Sporting Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gazzaniga, Michael. 1986. Mind Matters. Boston: The MIT Press.
Develops theory that the brain uses functional `modules' — i.e., overlapping systems which are widely distributed;

Geach, P. 1957. Mental Acts: Their Content and Their Objects. New York: Humanities Press.

Gendlin, Eugene. 1962. Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning. Toronto: Collier-Macmillan.
A symbol, such as a word, is used to help provide the material substratum for the corresponding state of consciousness.

Gendlin, Eugene. 1971. "A theory of personality change". In Alvin R. Mahrer (ed), Creative Developments in Psychotherapy. Cleveland: Case Western Reserve University Press, 439-489.
Since consciousness has the ontological status of a higher-order process or pattern of change in its substratum, it wants not only to reproduce elements of its substratum in order that the process may remain the same in certain respects, but also that the process may change in certain respects . Every process contains within itself a tendency to evolve over time into a somewhat differently patterned process. working out a careful and systematic way to observe the subjective experiencing process `from within.'

Gendlin, Eugene. 1973. "Experiential phenomenology". In Maurice Natanson (ed), Phenomenology and the Social Sciences. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 281-322.
Develops a phenomenally oriented view of language as a kind of tool-use in which we recognize the phenomally experienced results of using the tool in that way. "Linguistic analysis only looks like an analysis of language. What is actually analyzed is something very different: namely, our "knowing how to use" words in situations" (284). Although a symbol is used to help provide the substratum for the corresponding state of consciousness, thus enabling it to be vivid in consciousness, I would not have said the word in the first place had I not already desired to enact that pattern of consciousness or at least some similar or related pattern of consciousness symbolization also serves to change the state of consciousness into a next one which is `called for' by it. (See also Gendlin 1981, 1992.)

Gendlin, Eugene. 1981. Focusing. Toronto: Bantam.
More popularized discussion of many of the theoretical formulations formulated more precisely in the other Gendlin works (see above).

Gendlin, Eugene. 1992. "Thinking beyond patterns". In B. den Ouden and M. Moen (eds), The Presence of Feeling in Thought. New York: Peter Lang.
When we ask ourselves what we mean by a concept, there is always much more that was `implicitly' in our consciousness of the meaning than we were `explicitly' conscious of at the time when we used it, and the real meaning of the concept seems to be embedded in these implicit elements rather than in what we were explicitly conscious of at the time. Also sheds light on the problem that many `desires' in the non-conscious sense interact with each other and become more and more characterizable as desires in the conscious sense the more they can find substratum elements which allow representations relevant to desired further unfoldings of the life of the organism. This `focusing' process begins in the limbic region, leads to generalized arousal in the reticular activation system, sets up selective neuronal gating in the hippocampus, and activates the prefrontal region to formulate questions about what we need to experience or think about to meet the emotional need of the moment; the prefrontal area of the frontal lobe then leads us to `look for' certain images and concepts, which then become conscious notions through the activity of the parietal region and the secondary sensory areas;

Gentner, D. 1983. "Structure mapping: A theoretical framework for analogy." Cognitive Science 7, 155-170.

Gelman, Rochel. 1993. "First principles organize attention to and learning about relevant data: Number and the animate-inanimate distinction". Cognitive Science 14: 79-106.
Empirical study showing that, in early childhood, `first principles' (i.e., very general categories such as animate vs. inanimate) "organize attention to and learning about relevant data (79)." Because we look first for very general features, then for more detailed descriptions, we are able to use cybernetic feedback loops to quickly make our efferent `looking for' activity match the afferent activity of the primary and secondary projection areas in the various sensory modalities. It is found that an `animal' to a young child is anything that fairly well resembles an indeterminately colored, fuzzy creature with limbs (approximately four — there is no specific number, just as for most of us a mental image of the facade of the Pantheon has no definite number of columns), a creature which moves itself (fast or slow) and eats things (plants or other animals). But when the child is told that some microscopic organisms, even though they do not look like the earlier prototype image of `animal,' are animals `because they move themselves and eat things,' and that others are plants `because they make their own food,' the child must make the meaning of `animal' more complex and more precise. Confusion and frustration arise as the child tries to refine the old generic image so that it can carry the precision and complexity of the abstraction.

Gennaro, Rocco. 1996. Consciousness and Self-Consciousness. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
In agreement with David Rosenthal, it is argued that what makes a mental state conscious is the presence of a suitable higher-order thought directed at the mental state. In addition, the claim that `consciousness entails self-consciousness' is defended. Discusses the relationships between (self-) consciousness, behavior, memory, intentionality, and de se attitudes.

Genesee, Fred, J. Hamers, W.E. Lambert, M. Seitz, and R. Stark. 1978. "Language processing in bilinguals". Brain and Language 5: 1-12.
Studies the neurophysiological basis for language development by observing the way bilinguals' brain electrical activity is correlated with their use of languages, as opposed to the way most people process second languages.

Georgalis, Nicholas. 1994. "Asymmetry of Access to Intentional States". Erkenntnis 40: 185-211.
Argues for a distinction between conscious and unconscious processes on epistemological grounds: The sheer fact that information gets processed somehow or other does not mean by definition that consciousness of that information occurs, yet clearly the consciousness in many instances is needed to facilitate the processing. When consciousness is involved, what is happening neurophysiologically is fundamentally different from the way the brain functions when information is processed on a non-conscious basis.

Gerow, Josh. 1986. Psychology: An Introduction. Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Co.
The manipulation of verbal symbols is best performed by the left brain frontal area manipulation of verbal symbols is best performed by the left brain frontal area (esp. pp. 74-75). See also Luria 1973: 238-240, 156ff; Sperry 1966: 60-70.

Gibson, J.G., and W.A. Kennedy. 1960. "A clinical-EEG study in a case of obsessional neurosis". Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurology 12: 198-201.
EEG patterns, CT scans and other measures of neural activity in various parts of the brain are extensively correlated with obsessional thought patterns.

Giorgi, Amedeo. 1973. "Phenomenology and experimental psychology". In Amedeo Giorgi, William Fischer and Rolf von Eckartsberg (eds), Duquesne Studies in Phenomenological Psychology, Vol. I. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press/Humanities Press, 6-29.
Like Gurwitsch (1964(, shows that it is possible to develop sophisticated phenomenological methodologies which differentiate between accurate reporting of subjective processes and reporting distorted by interpretive processes.

Glasgow, Janice and Dimitri Papadias. 1992. "Computational imagery". Cognitive Science 16: 355-394.
Develops a theory to account for the ability to represent, retrieve, and reason about spatial and visual information not explicitly stored in long-term memory. There is alleged to be a special representational reasoning ability associated with the distinct visual and spatial components of mental imagery, using a formal theory of arrays and implemented in an array-based language.

Gleick, James 1987. Chaos: The Making of a New Science. New York: Viking Press.
General explanation of chaos theory, which is often used as a theoretical foundation for `enactive' approaches to mind. (E.g., see Varela et al).

Globus, G. 1995. The Postmodern Brain. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Expresses the postmodern rejection of representations as traditionally understood: "We do not know reality, according to postmodernism, by means of any re-presentations of that reality. We know reality directly and immediately; there is nothing that gets between us and the reality we always and already find ourselves in. Modernity, in contrast, relies on representations of the world – mental and neural re-presentations that mediate between us and the world." (127) Globus develops a nonlinear dynamical model of the brain that undergoes chaotic regimes and is subject to quantum nonlocality.

Globus, Gordon. 1987. Dream Life, Wake Life. New York: State University of New York Press.
Extensive theoretical formulation of the way dreams occur and their implications for the way the brain produces consciousness in general. Points out that a computational approach like Foulkes' requires that during dreaming the `inner life' contains `processing rules' which are more abstract than the incoming `data' from the senses. "The abstract representation is a universal that has indefinitely many instantiations; a particular instance cannot be recovered from it. We might go from a particular triangle to the concept of triangles, but then we cannot get back to that particular triangle or any particular triangle, except arbitrarily (Globus 1987: 122)." Thus, here again, in the computational approach the particulars of dreams must come from `stored memories,' and a proposed mechanism of `information processing' cannot become plausible until we know how and where the information is `stored.' Neisser wants to hold that dream images are `constructions' of the visual imagination, but on the other hand he needs to accommodate the conflicting phenomenal experience in which we do not seem to be just `imagining' the object, but rather `seeing' it. Some way is needed to understand how, on the one hand, dreams can arise in the way thoughts and mere images do during waking life — constructed from within — yet, on the other hand, are phenomenally experienced as if they were real perceptions not constructed from within.

Globus, Gordon and Stephen Franklin. 1982. "Prospects for the scientific observer of perceptual consciousness". In Davidson, Julian and Richard Davidson (eds), The Psychobiology of Consciousness. New York: Plenum, 465-482.
There is consciousness which is non-intentional in the phenomenological sense. Globus and Franklin particularly emphasize the importance of non-intentional consciousness in even grasping the essence of what consciousness is, aside from its ability to refer and compute. Perhaps meditative trance states are examples. A pure pain without reference to any picture or image either of the painful limb or the pain-inflicting object might be another example (the pure hylé in Husserl's sense). Or perhaps there are desires with no awareness of any object of desire — such as a vague feeling of restlessness or dissatisfaction.

Goldman, Alvin. 1969. "The compatibility of mechanism and purpose". Philosophical Review 78: 468-482.
Proposes a `nomic equivalence' concept as the only viable alternative to the identity thesis by proposing that the causal relations involved are `nomologically equivalent' with each other and therefore that the `exclusivity' principle of the necessary-and-sufficient relation in causal relata does not apply. I.e., we must deny in such cases that if A is necessary and sufficient for B, then no other event can also be necessary and sufficient for the same event.

Goldman, Alvin 1993. "The psychology of folk psychology." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, 15-28.
Argues that the concept of intentionality is not "invented;" not, at least, ab initio. The understanding an infant has of its own intentional actions is the most likely root of its understanding of the intentionality of other persons. What this means is that the concept of intentionality is not entirely invented, nor is it innate, on certain understandings of those terms. The concept develops naturally and organically out of the child's understanding of its immediate experience.

Goldman, Alvin. 1970. A Theory of Human Action. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
Attempts to develop a theory of action which is consistent with both mechanistic and intentional approaches to action, using a model of the difference between `types' and `tokens' of actions as a key concept. Goldman points out that performing a basic action, like raising one's arm, does not require conscious calculations of how to do it:

    This is not to deny that there are mechanisms – indeed a very complex and interesting array of mechanisms – that do cause my raising my arm. What is crucial, however, is that my ability to raise my arm at will does not depend on having any knowledge (or belief) of these mechanisms. (66)

In more complex actions, the unconscious mechanisms are inadequate and the agent must consciously decide on the means as well as on the goal.

Goldman, A. 1990. "Action and free will." In Visual Cognition and Action, v. 2, Osherson, D.N., Kosslyn, S.M., and Hollerbach, J.M. (eds), Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Goldman, A. 1986. Epistemology and Cognition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Goldman, A. 1976. "The volitional theory revisited." In Action Theory, Brand, M. and Walton, D. (eds), 67-83. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.

Goldman-Rakic, P. 1988. "Topography of cognition: Parallel distributed networks in primate association cortex." Annual Review of Neuroscience 11: 137-156.
Study of areas on the dorsolateral part of the prefrontal cortex, beneath the SMA, in both humans and monkeys. She found that damage to these areas in all subjects led to deficits in performance on various delayed action tests, in which the subject has to hold a representation of a certain operation on-line, awaiting an external signal to perform the operation. Humans with such damage are also deficient at the Wisconsin Card-Sorting Task, in which cards displaying symbols in various shapes and colors are sorted and matched according to various criteria, which are changed without warning. The new criterion is unavailable to the prefrontal patient for use in the task, even though, significantly, the patient is often able to verbalize the instructions.

Goldman-Rakic, P. 1987. "Circuitry of the prefrontal cortex and the regulation of behavior by representational memory." Handbook of Physiology 5 (Part 1, Ch. 9): 373-417.
Proposes that the prefrontal cortex governs behavior by means of "internalized or inner models of reality" and that "the concept [of the required card-sorting category] may be thought of as a second-order representation that cannot be accessed by the patient to guide response choice. The capacity for this type of representational system may be a unique property of human intelligence linked to the emergence of language but presumably built on a first-order representational capacity shared with other mammals." (378-379)

Goldman-Rakic, P. 1992. "Working memory and the mind." Scientific American, September, 110-117.

Goldstein, Irwin. 1994. "Identifying mental states: a celebrated hypothesis refuted". Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72: 46-62.
Points out that the behaviorist bias is still very much alive in contemporary cognitive theory. "Functionalism," he says, "is a descendent of the behavioristic approaches to the mind-body problem Ludwig Wittgenstein and Gilbert Ryle advanced (60)." The reason is that most functionalists, like behaviorists, hold that a mental event can be exhaustively described by citing its `inputs' and `outputs.' According to Goldstein, the essential problem with both behaviorism and functionalism is that "Statements connecting `pain' to dispositions to withdraw, moan, wince, or behave in other particular ways are not analytic (60)." Argues that functionalists, like behaviorists, hold that a mental event can be exhaustively described by citing its `inputs' and `outputs.'

Goldstein, Kurt. 1938. The Organism. New York: American Books.
The brain in Goldstein's experiments was able to replace cells that had been destroyed and to incorporate other cells into the needed functional continuity.

Gopnik, V. 1993. "How do we know our minds?" Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, 1-14.
Defends the view that, at least in the case of humans, infants develop a "theory" of intentional states.

    Empirical findings show that the idea of intentionality is a theoretical construct, one we invent in our early lives to explain a wide variety of evidence about ourselves and others. This theoretical construct is equally applicable to ourselves and others and depends equally on our experience of ourselves and others. (2)

An assumption at the root of the 'theory theory,' as it is sometimes called, is that humans are equipped with the ability to form theories about mechanisms operating in various environmental domains by generalizing to the best explanations of observed events in those domains. These generalizations lead to "naive" or "folk" doctrines, such as naive physics or folk psychology, by which we predict and "explain" observed events. Thus in the domain of human behavior we explain many events as being caused by "intentional" states such as "beliefs" and "desires," while we explain the behavior of inanimate objects in terms of nonintentional "forces."

Gordon, Peter, Jennifer Eberhardt, and Jay Rueckl. 1993. "Attentional modulation of the phonetic significance of acoustic cues". Cognitive Psychology 25: 1-42.
Studies the neurophysiological correlates of the way people process data based on cues that determine the focus of attention.

Gordon, R. 1986. "Folk psychology as simulation." Mind and Language 1, 2, 158-171.
The ability to represent another both subjectively and objectively is what Gordon calls 'simulation.' The simulation theory is intended to explain our folk psychology, or our understanding of the propositional attitudes of others – that they believe, fear, desire what it is that they describe. When, in a conversation with you, I attribute a belief to Smith, I am inviting you to engage with me in a game of pretending to be Smith:

    Stepping into Smith's shoes I might say: 'Dewey won the election.' Such assertions may then be used as premises of simulated practical inference. But wouldn't it be a great advantage to us practical simulators if we could pool our resources ? We'll simulate Smith together , cooperatively, advising one another as to what premises or practical inputs to practical reasoning would work best for a simulation of Smith. . . Of course, I couldn't come straight out with the utterance: 'Dewey won.' I need to flag the utterance as one that is being uttered from within a Smith-simulation mode and addressed to your Smith-simulation mode. I might do this by saying something like the following:
    1. Let's do a Smith simulation. Ready? Dewey won the election.
The same task might be accomplished by saying,
    2. Smith believes that Dewey won the election.
My suggestion is that (2) be read as saying the same thing as (1), though less explicitly. (167)

Granit, Ragnor. 1922. The Purposive Brain. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Emphasizes the emotional control of cerebral processes.

Gray, Jeffrey. 1990. "Brain systems that mediate both emotion and cognition". Cognition and Emotion 4: 269-288.
Extensive study of the ways in which consciousness is permeated and directed by emotion.

Greenfield, P. 1991. "Language, tools and brain: The ontogeny and phylogeny of hierarchically organized sequential behavior." Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 14, 4, 531-551.
Cites evidence of a common neural substrate (Broca's area) for language and object combination during the first two years of life in humans.

Greenwald, A. 1970. "Sensory feedback mechanisms in performance control." Psychological Review 77, 73-101.

Grice, P. 1957. "Meaning." Philosophical Review 66, 377-388.

Griffin, D. 1992. Animal Minds . Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Animals use language-like signs for communication, and in ways that may be more sophisticated than is currently appreciated.

Grossenbacher, Peter. 1996. Finding Consciousness in the Brain. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Review of recent findings regarding combination of new imaging technologies and experimental study of attention, linking brain activity to specific psychological functions. The book progresses from an overview of conscious awareness, through explanation of neurocognitive systems, and extends to theories which tackle global aspects of consciousness.

Gurwitsch, Aron. 1964. The Field of Consciousness. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.
Develops a more sophisticated phenomenological methodology than could have been envisioned by the early introspectionists or their critics.

H

Hanze, Martin and Friedrich Hesse. 1993. "Emotional influences on semantic priming". Cognition and Emotion 7: 195-205.
Empirical study of the influence of mood on cognitive processing in a semantic priming context. When in a positive mood, subjects show greater reduction of latency for a lexical decision task when a target word is presented in combination with an associatively related prime word. The authors theorize that mood has a general facilitating influence on spreading activation independent of the affective quality of the processed material.

Haldane, J. 1992. "Putnam on intentionality." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52, 3, 671-682.

Hardcastle, Valerie Grey. 1995. Locating Consciousness. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Argues that our qualitative experiences should be aligned with the activity of a single and distinct memory system in our mind/brain. Spelling out in detail what we do and do not know about phenomenological expereince, this book denies the common view of consciousness as a central decision-making system. Consciousness is viewed as a lower level dynamical structure nderpinning our information processing. Discusses absent qualia, the binding problem, the inverted spectra, and epiphenomenalism.

Hardin, C.L. 1988. Color for Philosophers. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.
Components of experience are processed separately in the brain, and there is no known location where the results of this processing converge (see Crick, 1984). Not only are different properties processed separately, but so are their different aspects: e.g. some cells respond to differences of hue between figure and ground, regardless of the specific hues involved;components of experience are processed separately in the brain,e.g. some cells respond to specific wavelengths regardless of surroundings (52-58). Also argues that the colors we see are not objective properties of physical objects, nor are they reducible to brain states. They are illusions caused by brain states, to which our color experiences are reducible (111). Hardin's approach is closer to the phenomenology of color than is Churchland's: if color experience is reducible, then we should not expect scientific knowledge to remove the illusion, as indeed it seems incapable of doing. Churchland thinks that the illusion that qualia are not brain states is caused by a false psychological theory. But if Hardin is right then the illusion is "wired-in," and hence can be explained but not abandoned.

Harlow, Harry. 1959. "Learning set and error factor theory". In Sigmund Koch (ed), Psychology: A Study of a Science, Vol. 2. New York: McGraw-Hill, 492-537.
Classic study of the way monkeys learn as based on motivational preconditions.

Harman, G. 1986. Change in View. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
On Harman's view, having a positive intention involves having an action plan, but an action can be intentional without being intended if it is merely foreseen as part of an intended action but not aimed at (88ff).

Harman, G. 1990. "The intrinsic quality of experience." In Philosophical Perspectives, 4, Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind, Tomberlin, J. (ed), 31-52.

Haugeland, J. 1979. "Understanding natural language." The Journal of Philosophy 76, 619-632.
Suggests that the way truly intentional things "have meaning" is active: they mean something by their own efforts; they are not simply used to mean something by some other agent.

Haugeland, J. 1985. Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea. Cambridge: MIT.
Computers themselves don't `mean' anything by their tokens (any more than books do) – they mean only what we say they do. Genuine understanding, on the other hand, is intentional "in its own right" and not derivatively from something else.

Hebb, Donald Olding. 1949. The Organization of Behavior. New York: Wiley.
Thoughts were hypothesized to be the activity of reverberating circuits (self-exciting loops) of neurons called "cell-assemblies." Chains of cell-assemblies called "phase sequences" were said to underlie sequences of organized behavior. Hebb was Karl S. Lashley's student; Hebb's ideas were the forerunners of John's "spatio-temporal waveforms" and Karl Pribram's "holograms in the brain." " ... A theory need not be right in order to be informative and to guide us in the right direction. And the cell-assembly theory ... inspired an enormous wealth of research findings, from the effects of sensory enrichment and deprivation to electrical and chemical pleasure centers in the brain to theoretical modeling of neural networks ... [A] negative lesson Hebb had learned from behaviorism was that it is unwise scientific practice to ignore anything, be it our brain, our biological heritage, our cognition or our conscious experience. There is the room---indeed the need---in Hebb's cognitive psychobiology for studying all of these. And just as he avoided arbitrary dismissiveness and question-begging, Hebb resisted any sense of premature closure, of already having found the answers. ..." (quoted from "D. O. Hebb, Father of Cognitive Psychobiology, 1904-1985," by Stevan Harnad at http://cogsci.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Archive/hebb.html). (This entry submitted by James Puckett, jpuckett@taiu.edu)

Held, Richard and Alan Hein. 1958. "Adaptation of disarranged hand-eye coordination contingent upon re-afferent stimulation". Perceptual and Motor Skills 8: 87-90.
Study in which kittens were srapped to carts pulled by other cats, so that they could not coordinate visual development with motor coordination; as a result, the kittens became functionally blind, thus supporting the view that visual information is processed by means of understanding how to manipulate and interact behaviorally with the environment.

Helmholtz, Hermann. 1962. Helmholtz's Treatise on Physiological Optics, J.P.C. Southall (trans). New York: Dover.
Classic study widely accepted among neurologists showing that "We let our eyes traverse all the noteworthy points of the object one after another." I.e., the organism must actively search for information in the environment before that information is consciously seen. Vision is active, not passive.

Hernandez-Peon, Raul, Harold Scherrer, and Michel Jouvet. 1956. "Modification of electrical activity in cochlear nucleus during attention in unanesthetized cats". Science 123: 331.
Classic study of the neurophysiological correlates of behavior in cats.

Hernandez-Peon, Raul, G. Chavez-Iberra, and E. Aguilar-Figuera. 1963. "Somatic evoked potentials in one case of hysteric anesthesia". Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology 15: 889-896.

Higgins, E.Tory and G. King. 1981. "Accessibility of social constructs: Information-processing consequences of individual and contextual variability". In Nancy Cantor and John Kihlstrom (eds), Personality, Cognition, and Social Interaction. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.
Confirms empirically that a conscious registering of a perceptual object leads to much more extensive processing of the data than the non-conscious registering of it could possibly lead to. It means that I am much more likely to remember the data, act on it, think about its further significance, and, if it is significant, look for recurrences of the object in the future (notwithstanding the contrary arguments of Fodor 1975, 1981, 1983, the Churchlands 1979, 1986, and Dennett's earlier work — for example, see 1969 -- that the difference between conscious and unconscious cognition makes no difference). See also Wyer and Srull (1981).

Hillis, A. and A. Caramazza. 1990. "The effects of attentional deficits on reading and spelling". In A. Caramazza (ed), Cognitive Neuropsychology and Neurolinguistics: Advances in Models of Cognitive Function and Impairment. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.
Shows that, in spite of non-conscious processing in `blindsight' and `priming' experiments, there are many kinds of learning and information processing that do not occur except with the help of conscious attention. (See also Weiskrantz 1986; Bullemer and Nissen 1990; Cohen et al 1990.)

Hirsch, H.V.B., and D.N. Spinelli. 1970. "Visual experience modifies distribution of horizontally and vertically oriented receptive fields in cats". Science 168: 869.
Empirical study showing that certain neurons in cats specialize in processing vertical lines, other horizontal, and that if cats are shown only vertical patterns, their horizontal perceptual ability does not develop, and vice versa.

Hoppe, Klaus. 1977. "Split brains and psychoanalysis". The Psychoanalytic Quarterly 46: 220-224.
(Hoppe 1977;
Forming visual (and auditory, etc.) images heavily involves right brain parietal and frontal function.

Horgan, Terrence. 1992. "Nonreductive materialism and the explanatory autonomy of psychology". In S. Wagner and R. Warner (eds), Beyond Materialism and Physicalism. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Makes the case for the possibility of multiple realizability, and suggests that it raises problems for the reducibility of mental to physical events.

Hubel, David H. and Torsten N. Wiesel. 1959. "Receptive fields of single neurons in the cat's striate cortex," Journal of Physiology 148: 574-591.
Classic study connecting perception to stimulation of the `feature detectors' in the columns of neurons in the primary projection area, and explore the columnar structure of these neurons as they fnction to represent various features of objects. Incoming sensory signals first activate the primary sensory area which is at the surface of the cortex, and then activate the `secondary sensory area' This secondary layer of cells adjacent to the primary projection area contains `feature detectors' which have been arranged through long-term learning and development to react only to specific features of environmental images — some cells reacting to right angles, some to vertical lines, some to horizontal, etc.

Hunt, Harry T. 1985. "Cognition and states of consciousness: The necessity for empirical study of ordinary and non-ordinary consciousness for contemporary cognitive psychology". Perceptual and Motor Skills 60: 239-282.
The Wurzburg controversy led to the widespread rejection of introspectionist and Gestalt methods in cognitive psychology . The question at stake was what kinds of phenomenal states or mental images subjects use when solving cognitive tasks. Subjects in these experiments seemed to be aware of having a sudden `insight' in which the solution to a problem suddenly `came to them,' but they could not describe their conscious experiencing of the cognitive process through which they attained the solution. The solution seemed to come to them involuntarily, the result of a process which they were either unaware of, could not reflect on, or could not describe in any intelligible way.

Husserl, Edmund. 1931-1969. Ideas. W.R. Boyce Gibson (trans). London: Collier; from "Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie," 1913.
Describes the situation in which the consciousness of an object is occurring, but not the consciousness of the object as really present in perception . The question arises as to whether our consciousness of an imaginary object is exactly the same as the corresponding perceptual consciousness, except that the imaginary consciousness does not posit the actual existence of the object. Extensively investigates the problem of distinguishing and relating the intentionality of imagination and the intentionality of perception.

Husserl, Edmund. 1962. Phänomenologische Psychologie. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
Attentive consciousness always involves an implicit or explicit process of `imaginative variation,' which is equivalent with saying that it involves counterfactuals in the same straightforward sense discussed by David Lewis. A being which registers only the presence of objects as they actually are, or reacts behaviorally only to actual stimuli, is not a conscious being.

Husserl, Edmund. 1966. The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness. James Churchill (trans). Bloomington: Indiana University Press; based on lectures delivered in 1905.
Classic study of the way time perception is experienced subjectively, and the ways this subjective experience relates to objective time.

Huttenlocher, J. 1968. "Constructing spatial images: A strategy in reasoning." Psychological Review 75, 286-298.
Describes a common strategy for solving three-term series problems by constructing imaginary arrays: "The Ss represent items as words (or abbreviations) rather than pictures, but they do not imagine having to write out these words. Instead, each word 'appears' as [the experimenter] reads it, and S then treats it as a material object which can be picked up and moved" (Huttenlocher 1968: 297).

I

Ito, M. 1993. "Movement and thought: Identical control mechanisms by the cerebellum." Trends in the Neurosciences 16, 11: 448-450.

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