CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE BRAIN:
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY


by

Ralph D. Ellis, Ph.D.
Clark Atlanta University
ralphellis@mindspring.com

Natika Newton, Ph.D.
New York Institute of Technology
nnewton@suffolk.lib.ny.us


Index: A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z

J

Jackendoff, R. 1983. Semantics and Cognition. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Proposes what he calls the conceptual structure hypothesis: "There is a single level of mental representation, conceptual structure, at which linguistic, sensory, and motor information are compatible" (17). Conceptual structure is governed by "conceptual well-formedness rules," which are universal and innate, and which dictate what concepts may be constructed in response to the subject's experience (17). In Jackedoff's view, the linguistic system is a subset of conceptual structure because "linguistic inference is but a special case of more general modality-independent principles that must be attributed even to nonverbal organisms" (19).

Jackendoff, Ray 1987. Consciousness and the Computational Mind . Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Clear defense of epiphenomenalism, although the epiphenomenalism often takes the form of a psychophysical identity theory. Explicitly argues that, if consciousness has no causal efficacy, then the study of it "is not good for anything (26)." But if the intentional explanation is neither necessary nor sufficient to explain an outcome, then it is causally irrelevant to the outcome. So any description of a conscious or intentional process which holds that this process is causally relevant must be false. Argues for an "intermediate level" theory of consciousness, rather than a central-level theory according to which conceptual structure is the essential content of consciousness (1987: 286), and he stresses the "top-down" influence of higher-level on lower-level representations in STM. In vision, the intermediate level corresponds to Marr's 2 1/2D sketch, which represents the surface appearance of objects in the visual field, distinct from the 3D model which represents the unseen surfaces and interiors of the objects (Marr 1982). On Jackendoff's account the 2 1/2D sketch ('the way things look ') and the 3D model (the "content" or "meaning" of visual awareness) are activated together when there is conceptual understanding of what is seen (1987: 294-295). While Jackendoff focuses on the blend in STM of different levels of representation, rather than on the blend of the material in STM with new input, he makes clear that activation of STM along with new input is required for perceptual awareness:

    STVM [short-term visual memory] should be seen as a device that creates and maintains several levels of visually relevant representation – at least 2 1/2D sketch, 3D model, and conceptual structure. STVM can be activated by input from lower levels in the case of perception, or by conceptual input in the case of imagery; whichever is the source of activation, a full set of levels is created.

Moreover, these levels are kept in registration with each other . . . this is suggested by the perceptual stability of the world in the face of constant eye movements. (188-189)


Jackendoff argues that STVM, while central to perception and imagery, is activated differently in each.

Jackson, Frank. 1986. "What Mary didn't know". Journal of Philosophy 83: 291-295.
Defense of the `knowledge argument' on the grounds that one of the main differences between mental event M1 and corresponding neurophysiological event N1 is that any objective observer can experience and measure N1, whereas only the person who directly and subjectively feels M1, and who is identified with the series M1, M2, M3, etc., can experience M1 as such. Moreover, the subjective description of M1 (from a phenomenological point of view) would not make the appropriate kind of sense, i.e., would not be an adequate description, unless described in terms of references to other items in the series M1, M2, M3, etc,; whereas a description of N1, N2, or N3 can frequently be adequate without references to other items in the series N1, N2, N3, etc. — especially to items in the series which have not yet occurred at the time of the one which is to be described.

Jacoby, Larry, and Colleen Kelley. 1992. "Unconscious influences of memory: Dissociations and automaticity". In A.D. Milner and M.D. Rugg (eds), The Neuropsychology of Consciousness. London: Academic Press, 235-62.
To recall a memory is to re-enact an efferent behavior, accompanied by a `feeling of recognition' or `feeling of familiarity' (the terms used by Mandler et al with regard to the subjective conviction that we remember something, as opposed to merely performing behaviorally as though we knew it). In agreement with Mandler et al 1990 and Mayes 1992.

James, William. 1890. Principles of Psychology. Dover Publications (1950).
Claims that awareness of self is just awareness of bodily events:

    Whenever my introspective glance succeeds in turning around quickly enough to catch one of these manifestations of spontaneity in the act, all it can ever feel distinctly is some bodily process, for the most part taking place within the head. . . .The 'Self of selves,' when carefully examined, is found to consist mainly of the collection of these peculiar motions in the head or between the head and throat. It would follow that our entire feeling of spiritual activity, or what commonly passes by that name, is really a feeling of bodily activities whose exact nature is by most men overlooked. (Vol. 1: 300-302)

Bodily awareness, James notes, is present not only when we try expressly to focus on our selves, but also during sensory imagery, or simply thinking about sensory objects: 'I cannot think in visual terms . . . without feeling a fluctuating play of pressures, convergences, divergences, and accommodations in my eyeballs' (300). In this case what is true of imagery seems also true of actual visual experience. The externality of perceptual objects supports the inference: objects are seen as external to me ; in the case of physical objects in the world, that means external to my body. They could not appear that way in the absence of any bodily awareness.

James, William. 1968. "Does `consciousness' exist". John McDermott (ed), The Writings of William James. New York: Random House, 169-170.
Classic statement of the view that consciousness is not an entity but a function.

Jeannerod, M. 1994. "The representing brain: Neural correlates of motor intention and imagery." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17:2, 187-244.
The motor images described by Jeannerod, like the "response images" of Goldman (1976), developed to control concrete physical actions, are used in the performance of non-basic, perhaps more abstract, higher-level cognitive activities. When we form concepts with respect to a given domain, we use the structures of these image schemata.

Jeannerod, M. 1988. The Neural and Behavioral Organization of Goal-Directed Movements. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Jibu, Mari, and Kunio Yasue. 1995. Quantum Brain Dynamics and Consciousness. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Introduction to quantum brain dynamics. Offers an account founded in fundamental quantum physical principles of how the brain functions as a unified system. Quantum physics for submicroscopic constituents of brain cells and tissues, and classical physics for the microscopic and macroscopic constituents are simultaneously justified by the theory developed. It poses an alternative to the dominant concepts in the neurosciences, which take neurons organized into networks as the basic constituents of the brain. Argues that certain physical substrates in the brain support quantum field phenomena, and that the resulting strange quantum properties can be used to explain consciousness and memory. It is argued that the whole of memory is stored in such a state of macroscopic order and that consciousness realized by the creation and annihilation dynamics of energy quanta of the electromagnetic field and molecular fields of water and protein.

John, Erwin Roy. 1967. Mechanisms of memory. New York: Academic Press. "In unpublished work, Herrington and Schneidau (1966) [later published in Experientia, 1968, 24, 1136-1137] ... have observed that the wave shapes resembling those normally evoked by presentation of a particular geometric form can be obtained in response to illumination of an empty visual field if the subject imagines that the same form is present in the field. This suggested that the wave shape might be related to the meaning of the stimulus. Therefore, stimuli were constructed consisting of the words 'square' and 'circle,' printed in block letters ... [the figure] shows that these two psychophysically equivalent verbal stimuli produce clearly different evoked response wave shapes" (pages 410-411). E. Roy John takes up where D. O. Hebb left off, building on Hebb's concepts of cell assemblies and phase sequences. John hypothesizes the existence of spatio-temporal waveforms consisting of the mass activation of millions or billions of neurons which, John posits, are indexed by averaged evoked potentials. Each spatio-temporal waveform has a distinctive pattern that encodes memories and underlies conscious experience.

John, E. Roy. 1972. Switchboard versus statistical theories of learning and memory. Science. 177, 850-864. "Presents a statistical configuration theory which proposes that the common mode of activity in massive numbers of neurons in anatomically extensive systems represents information about a learned experience. ... Findings suggest that the subjective experience of remembering is correlated with the release of readout processes, and it is hypothesized that coherent temporal patterns in the average activity of anatomically extensive neural ensembles may constitute the neurophysiological basis of subjective experience." (quoted from PsycINFO Database Copyright 1973 American Psychological Assn.).

John, E. Roy. 1991. Machinery of the Mind: Data, theory, and speculations about higher brain function. Boston: Birkhauser. "Based on the First Intl. Conference on Machinery of the Mind, Feb. 1989, Havana City, Cuba. Topics: Integrative Processes, Strange Attractors and Synchronization, Visual Information Processing, Cognitive Studies, Human Development, Brain Imaging. Many contributors including E. Basar, R.W. Doty, W.J. Freeman, S.A. Hillyard, D. Lehmann, G. Pfurtscheller, F.H. Lopes da Silva, K.H. Pribram, L.H. van der Tweel. ... " (quoted from Thomas F. Collura, Ph.D., www.brainmaster.com/brain/refs)

Johnson, Mark. 1987. The Body in the Mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Like Eleanor Rosch (1975), Johnson is an imagist who emphasizes a more fundamental role for images than for logical processes. Johnson emphasizes the role of the `supramodal body schema' in grounding rational thought in a kind of supramodal imagery. Johnson has developed even further Piaget's idea that we learn to perceive by learning what actions could be performed on which type of perceptual object (throwing, dropping, etc.). According to Johnson, ways of categorizing things (i.e., concepts) evolve from `kinaesthetic image schemas.' These schemas originate in bodily experience, and are used to structure our perception, imagination, and thinking — for example, through the `part-whole schema,' the `container schema,' the `source-path-goal schema,' etc. The image is the more basic neurophysiological event and mental content, and logical inference is a derivative event which can occur only because images are combined and used in certain ways. Until very recently, this approach suffered from the major handicap that it focused almost exclusively on visual imagery and ignored the role of other modalities, including kinaesthesia, proprioception and audition, in inferential thought processes. Newton (1982, 1993) has recently also begun to emphasize these other modalities.
        Johnson argues that "we make use of patterns that obtain in our physical experience to organize our more abstract understanding" (xv). Develops a theory of logical inference based on image schemata.

    . . .I want to suggest that the image schemata constrain inferences (and thus reasoning) in certain basic and important ways. They can do this because they have definite internal structure that can be figuratively extended to structure our understanding of formal relations among concepts and propositions. . . Because schemata are so central to meaning structure, they influence the ways in which we can make sense of things and reason about them. (38)

He argues that "structures of our experience work their way up into abstract meanings and patterns of influence" (Johnson 1987: xix). The structures of our experience take the form of 'image schemata;' an image schema is

    a dynamic pattern that functions somewhat like the abstract structure of an image, and thereby connects up a vast range of different experiences that manifest this same recurring structure.' (2)

Johnson-Laird, P. 1983. Mental Models. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
The understanding of discourse proceeds by the construction of mental models, analogical representational structures created by the language consumer in response to linguistic expressions. These structures represent domains, possibly abstract ones, in which the entities referred to are located and in which they interact. These models are constructed by procedures on the basis of the meanings of expressions; this 'procedural semantics' relates language, 'not to the world, but to mental models' (248). As we have seen, mental model theorists do not specify that models must be mental images; there is a close relation between models and images, however:

    There is plainly a relation between images and mental models, and I shall assume that images correspond to views of models: as a result either of perception or imagination, they represent the perceptible features of the corresponding real-world objects. In imagining, say, a rotating object, the underlying mental model of the object is used to recover a representation of its surfaces, reflectances, and so forth – what the late David Marr (1982), in referring to the process of perception, called the '2 1/2-D sketch.' (157)

Johnson-Laird considers the reconstruction of images as one standard way of coping with indeterminacy. When you describe something to me, I will construct a likely image, standing ready to revise it if necessary. This process can be demanding and confusing, however, and there are alternatives. One is to construct alternative models; this method, however, can lead to a combinatorial explosion of possibilities, and would work only for small numbers of possibilities. Another is to introduce a 'proposition-like element of notation into an analogical model' by some sort of mental 'tagging' of elements in the analogical representation (Johnson-Laird, 1983: 164).

Johnson-Laird, Philip N. 1972. "The three-term series problem". Cognition 1: 57-82.
Develops classic statement of the `mental models' hypothesis, in which thoughts and representations are parts of an ongoing model of the world; theorizes and to some extent empirically supports the hypothesis that subjects represent the world in quasi-spatial models, reasoning with spatial analogies in unfamiliar contexts, but using familiar linguistic patterns when new thinking is not required.

Johnson-Laird, Philip N. 1993. Human and Machine Thinking. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.
The subjunctive conditional is a modification of a closely related mental activity — the expectation as to what will happen in the future given certain conditions . I.e., the difference between `If I throw this object at that one, this one will knock that one over' on the one hand, and on the other hand `If I were to throw this object at that one, it would knock that one over' is very slight. In believing that one thing will or would lead to another, we are imagining a future or possible occurrence which we feel confident will or would occur, given certain actual or imaginable conditions .

Johnson-Laird, Philip N. 1994. "Mental models and probabilistic thinking". Cognition 50: 189-209.
Revised formulation of the `mental models' theory to include extensive discussion and empirical support for a theory about the way mental models support logical reasoning, particularly probabilistic thinking. "To the extent that individauls grasp the truth condition sof propositions containing abstract concepts, such as friendship, ownership and justice, they must be able to envisage situations that satisfy them, that is, to form mental models of these situations" (192). Mental models theyr makes three principal predictions, for which Johnson-Laird cites empirical support: (1) The greater the number of models that an inference calls for, the harder the task will be. (2) "Erroneous conclusions will tend to be consistent withs the premises rather than inconsistent withs them; reasoners will err because they construct some of the models of the premises -- typically, just one model of them -- and overlook other possible models." (195) (3) "Subjects will search more assiduously for alternative models when a putative conclusion is unbelievable than when it is believable." (195)

Johnson-Laird, Philip N., and R.M.J. Byrne. 1989. "Only reasoning". Journal of Memory and Language 28: 313-330.
Follows up still further on the development of mental models theory as it pertains to deductive reasoning (see Johnson-Laird 1972).

Johnson-Laird, Philip N., and R.M.J. Byrne. 1991. Deduction. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.
Develops the theory of mental models to account for deductive reasoning, focusing primarily on syllogistic reasoning skills.

Jorgensen, Julia, and Rachel J. Falmagne. 1992. "Aspects of the meaning of if...then for older preschoolers: Hypotheticality, entailment, and suppositional processes". Cognitive Development 7: 189-212.
Develops theory of the way mental models are used to represent deductive logical relationships (see Johnson-Laird 1989, 1991). Shows that young children can do some hypothetical reasoning. But this reasoning is extremely flawed in that children reason better with concrete images than abstract concepts, and are very prone to confuse a statement with its converse, indicating that children vaguely associate images with each other much more than they understand the precise relationship between the corresponding concepts. In this gradual transition from vague associations to precise concepts, then, a generic image of `horse,' for example, seems to function in many respects just as the concept `horse' would function, with a very important difference:
Joseph, Rhawn. 1982. "The neuropsychology of development: hemispheric laterality, limbic language and the origin of thought". Journal of Clinical Psychology 38: 4-33.
Emphasizes the role of emotional speech as motivating the self-questioning process, and suggests (consistently with Tucker) that self-talk evolves initially as a kind of truncated action. I.e., a crucial developmental process occurs when the interpretation or evaluation of an imagined action precedes its actual execution, so that the action's consequences can be (subjunctively) imagined. In this way, the self-questioning of the frontal lobe evolves out of the truncating of motor behaviors, resulting in the ability to question images.

Jouvet, Michel. 1967. "Neurophysiology of the states of sleep". Physiological Review 47: 117-127.
Classic studies showing continual neocortical activity throughout sleep, including non-modally-specific parietal activity. But this active neocortex is isolated from the environment as well as from the muscular control of the body — the condition Jouvet termed `paradoxical sleep.'

Julesz, B. 1984. "A brief outline of the texton theory of human vision." Trends in Neuroscience, February.
(See also Anne Treisman 1986) Indicates a preattentive stage of visual processing when certain features (such as a square in a field of circles) automatically "pop out" while others require a deliberate focus of attention. A significant finding is that the "pop-out" features are not at this stage bound to other features with which they are actually associated, and errors of synthesis occur when subjects describe brief visual displays. Thus it appears that objects in the visual field are decomposed in early vision and are somehow put back together again later. A major problem has been to explain how this resynthesis occurs without a homunculus (the "binding problem"). We cannot hope for a group of contiguous neurons to represent the combined features of an object, given the number of different objects that can be recognized and greater number of ways they can appear. The representation of an object is distributed about the brain.

K

Kahneman, E. 1973. Attention and Effort. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
Inhibitory neurotransmitters are more richly distributed in the frontal lobe than elsewhere, and are more plentiful in humans than in other animals. (See also Cohen et al 1988; Posner and Rothbart 1992: 98-99; Luria 1973, 1980.)

Kandel, Eric, and James Schwartz. 1981. Principles of Neural Science. New York: Elsevier-North Holland.
General discussion of the way nerve impulses travel in the nervous system. The supplementary motor area (SMA) is involved in constructing plans for complex sequences of movements. These plans are abstract in the sense that they do not specify details of the movement, which are selected and activated by the primary motor cortex in light of computations of specific movement parameters (496).

Kaufman, G. 1980. Imagery, Language and Cognition: Toward a Theory of Symbolic Activity in Human Problem-Solving. Berlin: Universitetsforlaget.
Empirical support for Johnson-Laird's hypothesis that "spatial" strategies are used to facilitate reasoning in unfamiliar contexts, but then as the reasoning task becomes more familiar the subjects switch to "linguistic" strategies.

Keller, Janet, and F.K. Lehman. 1991. "Complex concepts". Cognitive Science 15: 271-291.
Whereas Rosch (1975) bases the cognitive status of abstract concepts on the generalized or generic image, this new kind of `prototype' theory emphasizes imagery, yet ends up with a cognitive role for concepts which is clearly and utterly divergent from the role of images, although it is also hoped that concepts ultimately can be shown as built up from images, which are the more elementary cognitive function.

Kelley, C.M. and Jacoby, L.L. 1990. "The construction of subjective experience: Memory attributions." Mind and Language 5, 1, 49-68.

Kersetz, A. 1988. "Cognitive fuction in severe aphasia." In Thought Without Language, Weiskrantz, L. (ed), 451-463. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
While Broca's aphasia is associated with disorders of language expression and related motor difficulties, it can be dissociated from nonverbal cognitive abilities. Kersetz reports studies of 75 global aphasics who performed well on a non-verbal test of intelligence, Raven's colored progressive matrices (RCPM). He concludes that the "relative preservation of nonverbal performance in the severely affected aphasics presented here argues for a dissociable process of language and high-level thought" (459).

Kimura, Doreen, and Y. Archibald. 1974. "Motor functions of the left hemisphere," Brain 97: 337-350.
Speech evolves neurophysiologically as a truncated form of motoric behavior. I.e., to think a word is to imagine ourselves saying the word. See also Studdert-Kennedy and

Kimura, D. 1979. "Neuromotor mechanisms in the evolution of human communication." In Neurobiology of Social Communication in Primates, Steklis, H. and Raleigh, M.J. (eds), 197-219. New York: Academic Press.

Koch, Christof. 1987. "The action of the corticofugal pathway on sensori-thalamic nuclei: A hypothesis." Neuroscience 23, 2, 399-406.
Classic study the connections between the thalamus and the cortex. Koch hypothesizes that attention to specific areas in the visual field is mediated by feedback from the visual cortex to certain receptors (NMDA receptors) of cells in the LGN, which intensifies the response of those cells to retinal input, the function of this feedback being to enhance 'conspicuous or interesting features in sensory stimulus-space' (1987: 403). On this account, raw input passes from the retina through the thalamus to the cortex, to be processed for significant qualitative features. Signals from the cortex back to the original thalamic cells increase the gain of these cells, which then transmit enhanced signals back to the cortex as long as new retinal input continues. The enhanced signals constitute a primary representation of the qualitative aspects of external objects. Since the cortical cells cannot distinguish processed from unprocessed data, these enhanced or processed signals are received as though they were external input. Thus it is likely that this attentional mechanism also contributes to the illusion that qualitative properties are part of the external world.

Koch, C. and S. Ullman. 1985. "Shifts in selective visual attention: Towards the underlying neural circuitry." Human Neurobiology 4: 219-227.
Argues that enhanced attention to perceptual data projects from the thalamus to a saliency map in the cortex, which codes the most conspicuous portions of the visual field. On the basis of this map, semi-synchronous oscillations of neural firing at various locations in the cortex are effected. These locations process features of significant objects, which are represented by the resulting unification of their features. As Crick puts it in an earlier paper (see Crick 1984),

    The content of the cell assembly – the "meaning" of all the neurons so linked together – can in this way be impressed on the rest of the system in a manner that would not be possible at all if all of the neurons in it fired at random times, unless they were firing very rapidly indeed. (4589)

This binding mechanism together with reentrant signaling may explain how in perception we have a unified "picture" of the external world, complete with already-processed "qualitative" properties, as though it had come in directly from the outside.

Komisaruk, Barry. 1977. "The role of rhythmical brain activity in sensorimotor integration". In James Sprague and Alan Epstein (eds), Progress in Psychology and Physiological Integration. New York: Academic Press, v. 7.
Finds that hippocampal theta rhythms are necessary to synchronize sensory information before we can be conscious of it. evidence for the importance of synchronization shows up in studies where the disruption of circadian and ultradian rhythms leads to desynchronization of the hypothalamus and cerebral cortex, which in turn leads to severe mental conditions such as schizophrenia and psychotic depression (see Restak 1984: 101-145).

Koriat, A., Lichtenstein, S. and Fischhoff, B. 1980. "Reasons for confidence". Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory 6: 539-541.
Memory retrieval studies in which the `feeling of knowing' is present with a content not presently being entertained in consciousness.

Kosslyn, Stephen M. 1983. Ghosts in the Mind's Machine: Creating and Using Images in the Brain. New York: W.W. Norton.
Purely inferential and computational processes may sometimes produce mental images in the ways posited by Paivio (1986, 1988) or Glasgow and Papadias (1992), but are not themselves produced by imaging processes. If the angles, lines and contours received by the primary projection area are digitally analysed to produce the image, it is argued, then a process of computational inference occurs prior to the image; therefore, the process of logical inference itself cannot presuppose images.According to Kosslyn, imagery is a useful tool for the performance of spacial and perceptual tasks, but is hardly a necessary ingredient of all thought processes, and definitely is not necessary for deductive logical inferences.

Kretch, David, M. Rosenzweig, and E. Bennett. 1962. "Relations between brain chemistry and problem-solving among rats raised in enriched and impoverished environments". Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology 55: 801-807.
Finds that the structure of rats' brains is changed as a result of learning activity.

Kretch, David, M. Rosenzweig, and E. Bennett. 1966. "Effects of environmental complexity and training on brain chemistry". Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology 53: 509-519.
Further investigation of the phenomena studied in Kretch et al (1962); it is found that rats which engaged in learning experiments show 4 percent more acetylcholinesterase in their brains, a significantly greater brain mass, and more glial cells, than a control group of rats that did not engage in learning experiments, thus showing the extent to which behavior can affect structure and chemical composition of the brain.

Kripke, S. 1972. "Naming and necessity." In Semantics of Natural Language, Davidson, D. and Harman, G. (eds). Dordrecht: D. Reidel.

Kurata, K. 1992. "Somatotopy in the human supplementary motor area." Trends In Neurosciences 15,5, 159-161.
Activity in the supplementary motor area (SMA) is associated with the formation of a conscious intention.

Kutas, M., and Hillyard, S.A. 1980. "Reading senseless sentences: Brain potentials reflect semantic incongruity." Science 207, 203-205.

L

Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson. 1987. Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
We structure our experience by means of 'idealized cognitive models:'

    Cognitive models are directly embodied with respect to their content, or else they are systematically linked to directly embodied models. Cognitive models structure thought and are used in forming categories and in reasoning. Concepts characterized by cognitive models are understood via the embodiment of the models. (13)

The idea is that we begin with the experiences of bodily motion and motor interactions with objects in our environment. These experiences form image patterns (schemata) in terms of which we understand new experiences in new, wider domains: we structure the new domains with the schemata derived from our bodily experience. In that sense we "understand" these domains in terms of bodily actions. Meaning on all levels is created by "image schematic structures" derived from basic experiences of embodied action. These structures define basic actions and also higher-level conceptual structures, including abstract ones, that are meaningful for us. Lakoff explains the roles of these structures:

    1. There are at least two kinds of structure in our preconceptual experiences:
    A. Basic-level structure: Basic-level categories are defined by the convergence of our gestalt perception, our capacity for bodily movement, and our ability to form rich mental images.
    B. Kinesthetic image-schematic structure: Image schemas are relatively simple structures that constantly recur in our everyday experience: CONTAINERS, PATHS, LINKS, FORCES, BALANCE, and in various orientations and relations: UP-DOWN, PART-WHOLE, CENTER-PERIPHERY, etc.
    These structures are directly meaningful, first, because they are directly and repeatedly experienced because of the nature of the body and its mode of functioning in our environment. . .

    2. There are two ways in which abstract conceptual structure arises from basic-level and image-schematic structure:
    A. By metaphorical projection from the domain of the physical to abstract domains.
    B. By the projections from basic-level categories to super- ordinate and subordinate categories. (267-68)

Lakoff, G. and Johnson, M. 1980. Metaphors We Live By. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Langacker, R.W. 1987. The Foundations of Cognitive Grammar, Vol. I. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Semantic structures are identical to the mental models and image schemata created in language use; "Semantic structure is conceptualization tailored to the specifications of linguistic convention . . . I believe that mental experience is real, that it is susceptible to empirical investigation, and that it constitutes the natural subject matter of semantics" (99). Abstract domains are structured on the basis of physical domains, and hence their fundamental elements – entities and their relations – are referred to in physical terms. For this reason the sensorimotor theory has had particular appeal for linguists.

Lashley, Karl S. 1929. Brain mechanisms and intelligence: A quantitative study of injuries to the brain. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press. (New York: Dover, 1963).
"Theories, methods, influence of lesions on learning and memory, sensory and motor defects in rat, dog, monkey. Neural mechanisms in adaptive behavior. ... This book chronicles Lashley's pioneering work, which proved that memory and learning are not "localized" in the cerebral cortex. Experiments, results, and analysis clearly and logically presented." (quoted from Thomas F. Collura, Ph.D.)
Lashley, Karl. 1950. "In search of the engram". In Symposium of the Society for Experimental Biology, No. 4. London: Cambridge University Press.
Famous paper in which Lashley argues that there are no memory engrams in the brain, because extensive attempts to locate them have consistently failed.

Lavy, Edith and Marcel van den Hout. 1994. "Cognitive avoidance and attentional bias: Causal relationships". Cognitive Therapy and Research 18: 179-194.
Interesting discussion of the efferent `looking for' process that grounds mental images, implying that this process is controlled with the participation of the frontal lobe, which guides the activity of `looking for' in directions important for the emotional purposes of the organism, for example by controlling the selective inattention process. (See also Mele 1993;

LeDoux, J. E. 1992. "Brain mechanisms of emotion and emotional learning." Current Opinion in Neurobiology 2:191-197.
The distinction between imaged emotions and "real" ones is not so clear as that between images and other sorts of sensations. Emotions are activated similarly by novel experiences and remembered ones. Via connections with the amygdala, sensory information includes emotional content.

Legrenzi, P., V. Girotto, and P.N. Johnson-Laird. 1993. "Focussing in reasoning and decision making". Cognition 49: 37-66.
Empirical study showing that subjects `focus' only on aspects of situations that are relevant to planning and hypothesis-testing. Using Wason's selection task, it is found that subjects tend to select only those cards taht are explicitly represented in their initial models of the conditional rule. Thus these authors' theory is that this planning and hypothesis testing is done by means of `mental models.' (See Johnson Laird 1994.)

Leiner, H.C., Leiner, A.L. and Dow, R.S. 1993. "Cognitive and language functions of the human cerebellum." Trends in the Neurosciences 16, 11: 444-447.
Empirical work on the cerebellum, indicating that its mechanisms, evolved for motor control, are involved in abstract reasoning processes. Thus in light of this work, we can claim strong support for the view that the understanding of abstract structures is founded upon the understanding of embodied ones. Understanding a description of an abstract theory involves processes essentially the same as those involved in understanding a description of a physical scenario, such as the entrance to a friend's house.

Lenneberg, Eric. 1967. Biological Foundations of Language. New York: Wiley.
General discussion of the neurophysiological correlates of language.

Leslie, A. and Roth, D. 1992. "What autism teaches us about metarepresentation." In Understanding Other Minds: Perspectives from Autism, Baron-Cohen, S., Tager-Flusberg, H. and Cohen, D. (eds). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Following the `theory-theory' approach to folk psychology (see Meltzoff and Gopnik 1993) Leslie and Roth propose that a metarepresentation is a data-structure which takes information from the observed behavior of another person and constructs a representation of a relationship among three components: an agent, a state of the world, and a "decoupled" representation of that state. The result could take the form:

    mother PRETENDS [of] the banana [that] 'it is a telephone.' (87)

This type of structure could be used to represent another person's attitude of interest in a particular state of the world.

Leyhausen, Paul. 1979. Cat Behavior New York: Garland Press.
Especially emphasizes the role of inhibition in truncating pre-programmed behavior, primarily through experiments with the motor behavior of cats.

Liberman, A.M., F.S. Cooper, D. Shankweiler, and M. Studdert-Kennedy. 1967. "Perceptions of the speech code". Psychological Review 74: 431-461.
Empirical support for the view that speech evolves as a runcated motoric behavior.

Libet, Benjamin, A.G. Curtis, E.W. Wright, and D.K. Pearl. 1983. "Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential). The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act". Brain 106: 640.
Finding of `expectancy waves' in the brain prior to voluntary action; often the waves occur prior to consciousness of an intention ot act.

Lieberman, P. 1991. Uniquely Human: The Evolution of Speech, Thought, and Selfless Behavior. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Argues that human language evolved from motor sequencing areas of the cortex, even though in the brains of nonhuman primates the areas homologous to the areas specialized for human speech do not control vocalization. Vocalization in nonhumans is not under voluntary control, and is subserved by subcortical regions (52-53). Human speech may, he argues, have evolved from a gestural system, which is under voluntary control and which is regulated by cortical regions adjacent to those controlling throat, mouth and facial movements. Lieberman's position is that grammatical syntax is made possible by the evolution of structures for coordinating sequential motor operations, specifically speech motor control. The structures are analogous: "The sequence of symbols that define a sentence determines the context in which one symbol is substituted for another. Similar rules describe speech motor control for even seemingly simple motor tasks, such as providing a sufficient supply of oxygen while we speak. (107-108) Lieberman does not deny the existence of brain mechanisms specialized for syntax, given the selective advantage of communication they confer. His claim concerns their evolutionary origins.
Livingston, M. and Hubel, D. 1988. "Segregation of form, color, movement and depth: Anatomy, physiology, and perception." Science 240, 740-749.

Logan, G.D. 1980. "Attention and automaticity in stroop and priming tasks: Theory and data". Cognitive Psychology 12: 523-553.
Subjects are more likely to see a given type of object when they are already holding in mind the mental image of that type of object. Correlatively, it is difficult to hold in mind one image while seeing another object which conflicts with the image. (See also Posner and Rothbart 1992.) Thus the conscious registering of a perceptual input presupposes a motivated attentional process before perceptual consciousness (i.e., a perceptual image) can occur.

Ludwig, Arnold. 1972. "Hysteria: A neurobiological theory". Archives of General Psychiatry 27: 771-777.
Like Miller (1984), studies the role of the reticular activating system in perception and demonstrates the role of the frontal-limbic connection in recognizing the meaning of a remembered image. See also Thompson 1975.

Lukacs, Georg. 1966. "Existentialism or Marxism". In Existentialism versus Marxism, G. Novak, ed. New York: Delta Press, 134-153.
Argues against Husserlian phenomenology on the ground that phenomenological description must brack the empirical world, and thus cannot reveal any real correlations between subjective and objective realms, thus becoming solipistic.

Luria, Alexander R. 1968. The Mind of a Mnemonist. Chicago: Henry Regenery Co.
Finds that physical disruption of almost any part of the brain (midbrain, frontal, parietal, temporal, etc.) interferes with memory function. Also stresses that memory involves a great deal of imagistic cross-modal generalization.

Luria, Alexander R. 1973. The Working Brain. New York: Basic Books.
Sees the frontal lobe as "formulating the problem" to be solved by the brain (1973: 188). "This increase in cortical tone resulting from formulation of the problem is disturbed in patients with a pathological lesion of the frontal cortex (188)." Lesions of the frontal lobe "disturb . . . activity which is controlled by motives formulated with the aid of speech (199)" and "The patient can no longer direct and control his behavior with the aid of speech, either his own or that of another person (211)." Perhaps most revealing is the observation, "Having read the conditions of the problem, the patient [when asked to repeat them] . . . usually omits the most important part of the problem, namely its final question, or replaces the question by inert reproduction of one of the conditions (219)." Thus, in Luria's view, the frontal lobe is active when we pose a problem or question to ourselves that requires that we do some thinking. The frontal lobe continues to grow and develop until about age 14, but has achieved most of its growth by about age 8-10 (pp. 87, 270). "Human gnostic activity never takes place with respect to one single isolated modality . . . the perception — and still more the representation — of any object is a complex procedure, the result of polymodal activity. . . .(72-73)" And again, "Human mental processes are complex functional systems and . . . they are not `localized' in narrow, circumscribed areas of the brain. . . .(43)"

Luria, Alexander R. 1980. Higher Cortical Functions in Man, 2nd ed. New York: Basic Books.
Extensive followup data confirming the general views advocated in Luria (1973), especiall with regard to the functioning of the frontal cortex.

Lyons, William. 1983. "The transformation of introspection". British Journal of Social Psychology 22: 327-342.
Historical discussion of the way recent theorists have accounted for introspection (or failed to do so), with special emphasis on functionalist accounts.

Lyons, William. 1984. "Dennett, functionalism, and introspection". Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11: 55-83.
Extensive critique of the notion that functionalism can account for introspection computationally simply in the way that computers can `refer' to the mechanisms of their own processes.

Lyons, William. 1986. The Disappearance of Introspection. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Pursues the implications of the fact that our subjective explanation of our own mental processes (i.e., `folk psychology') leads us to believe that these mental processes are causally relevant to our behavior and to the output of our information processing. Thus our subjective explanation of our own mental processes (or `folk psychology') is false — no amount of knowledge of the physiological correlates of a headache can ever lead a neurologist to know what a headache feels like unless the neurologist personally has at some point felt something that feels like a headache. Since our experience of our own consciousness obviously does make the claim that knowledge of subjective events can never be exhausted by any amount of knowledge of objectively observable physical events, and since the mechanistic cognitive theorist is committed to the claim that the objectively observable physical events do constitute an exhaustive explanation, then here again the mechanistic cognitive theorist must conclude that our experience of our own consciousness is false. This point is made very well with regard to functionalism and eliminative materialism. See also Donald MacKay (1984), William Lyons (1983, 1984).

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